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The above chart was published by the Washington Post on December 15, 2012, illustrating the 
unparalleled rate of individual gun ownership per capita in the United States versus that of every other 
country in the world1. With more than 200-250 million privately-owned guns in circulation, the 
United States has more privately own guns than any other country2. Not incidentally, they also have an 
inordinately high number of gun-related deaths and injuries – in a given day, an average of 276 people 
are shot. Of those shot, 84 will die as a result of their wounds.3 Since 1982, 62 mass murders have been 
committed via firearms, and over 75% of the 142 guns used in those 62 mass murders were obtained 
legally.4 The necessity for more stringent gun laws is at an all-time high. In the course of writing this 
paper, another mass shooting occurred wherein at least 28 people, many of whom were not yet it their 
first ten years of life and all of whom were shot multiple times, were killed at an elementary school in 
Connecticut5. 
1 From Max Fisher’s Article “What makes America’s gun culture totally unique in the world, in four charts,” published in 
The Washington Post on December 15, 2012. Accessible at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/12/15/what-makes-americas-gun-culture-totally-
unique-in-the-world-as-demonstrated-in-four-charts/?tid=pm_pop 
2 From Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, and Adam M. Samaha’s article “Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from 
a Social Welfare Perspective,” published in the University of California Law Review, Vol. 56 (Feb. 2009) at pg. 5. 
3 From Bernard Lagan’s article, “America's gun outrage: 276 people killed or wounded a day,” published in The Age on 
November 9, 2009. Accessible at http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/americas-gun-outrage-276-people-killed-
or-wounded-a-day-20091109-i4gj.html 
4From Mark Follman, Gavin Aronsen, and “Deanna Pan’s article A Guide to Mass Shootings in America,” published 
December 15, 2012 in Mother Jones. Accessible at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map 
5 On December 14, 2012, between the completion of the first draft of this paper on December 12th and its submission on 
December 21th, a 20-year old opened fire at Sandy Hook Elementary School to kill over 20 children and 8 adults and, the 
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Despite this pressing need to control the violence, the Supreme Court, in the 5-4 decision District 
of Columbia v. Heller (2008)6, struck down an ordinance restricting the ownership of handguns within 
the District of Columbia. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Heller, codifying an individual’s fundamental 
right to own a gun for the purpose of self-defense through a peculiar interpretation of the meaning of 
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, and in McDonald v. City of Chicago7, 
incorporating Heller’s newly-determined Second Amendment Right through the Fourteenth 
Amendment to apply and “to some extent limit the legislative freedom of the States”8 display an 
appalling level of indifference to the “general welfare” and to the meaning of the Constitution that they 
are supposed to be expounding. These decisions curtailed the hotly contested debate surrounding Gun 
Control in the United States, giving a Constitutional justification to the proponents of one side. Instead 
of exercising judicial restraint concerning issues of national discourse or properly interpreting the 
Constitution, they ruled in accordance with their own agenda to give a Constitutional foundation to one 
side of a hotly contested social issue9. 
In the direct aftermath of the Aurora, Colorado shooting, wherein James Holes entered a movie 
theater, armed with a 100-round drum magazine, a Smith & Wesson M&P15 assault rifle (the “civilian 
version of the Military’s M-16) capable of firing 60 bullets per minute, a Remington shotgun, and a .40 
caliber handgun, 10 shot 71 people and killed 12,  Colorado saw a 41% increase in background checks 
for hopeful gun owners that weekend, a response “not unusual” after a mass shooting.11 Furthermore, 
following day, three people were following a gun altercation at an Alabama hospital and man fired 50 rounds in a 





On Newport Beach, CA: http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/15/local/la-me-mall-shooting-20121216 
6 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
7 McDonald v. Chicago, 561 US 3025 (2010). 
8 McDonald, opinion of Justice Alito, writing for the majority, 561 US at ____ (slip op., at 44). 
9 As Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III notes in his article “Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law,” published in 
the Virginia Law Review, Vol 95, No 2 (April 2009) at page  256, “Law’s power to shape human conduct depends on its 
perceived legitimacy as much as on the threat of force that stands behind its commands.” This illustrates the impact on the 
firearms debate that Heller and subsequently McDonald likely had: bestowing upon pro-gun arguments a legitimacy based 
in the text of the Constitution. (Hereafter revered to as Wilkinson, “Of Guns, Abortion”) 
10 From “Aurora, Colo., shooting spree: A day of tears for victims and of twists in case,” published in the Washington Post 
on July 22, 2012. Accessible athttp://www.washingtonpost.com/national/explosives-removed-from-james-holmess-
apartment-and-destroyed-officials-say/2012/07/22/gJQAL9XN2W_story.html 
11 From Sara Burnett’s article “Aurora theater shooting: Gun sales up since tragedy,” published in the Denver Post on July 
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a survey of public opinion conducted after the shooting revealed 46% of the population believed that 
right of gun ownership should be more protected while 47% supported more restrictions via gun control 
laws.12 Aurora and similar tragedies demonstrate why the debate surrounding gun control and gun 
protection is so fierce: incidences of mass violence either incite fear, causing one to support protection 
measures via gun ownership or via stricter gun legislation. The Supreme Court’s decisions put the fate 
of the gun debate in the hands of the Justices, and, based on the decisions of both cases, the majority 
does not know how to shoot nearly as well as James Holmes does. 
There are a plethora of reasons why Heller and, by proxy, McDonald were erroneously decided. 
This paper will focus primarily on Heller because Justice Scalia, writing for the Heller majority, created 
a new right that was simply expanded in scope by McDonald; therefore, much of the gun-as-
fundamental-right reasoning in McDonald is a reiteration of the Heller decision13. Heller is considered 
a “landmark decision” because of this cavalier rendition of the meaning of the Second Amendment, a 
meaning largely uncontested since its adoption on December 15, 1791. But, in striking down an attempt 
by a legislature to make its citizens safer through passing a law restricting the ease with which one 
could obtain a handgun in the District of Columbia, the Court Acted politically, irrationally, and opened 
the floodgates for a further expansion of the new right that they discovered. If less guns means less 
violence, and less violence means less death14, the Supreme Court stripped states and cities of their 
ability to exercise their constitutional responsibility as delineated in the 10th Amendment to ensure the 
safety of their polity through police powers15. 
25, 2012. Accessible at http://www.denverpost.com/termsofuse http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_21142159/gun-
sales-up-since-tragedy 
12 The Pew Center for the People and the Press public opinion poll on attitudes following the Aurora shooting were 
addressed in their article “Views on Gun Laws Unchanged After Aurora Shooting,” Published July 30, 2012. Accessible at 
http://www.people-press.org/2012/07/30/views-on-gun-laws-unchanged-after-aurora-shooting/ 
13 The McDonald decision is important in its own right. At the same time, it is less of a discussion of the Second 
Amendment and more of a symposium on the meaning of the Due Process Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the process of incorporating the Bill of Rights to apply to the states through that 
Amendment. Heller, conversely, is a landmark decision wholly dedicated to redefining the meaning of the Second 
Amendment and the context of the gun debate. 
14“Where there are more guns, there is more homicide.” Harvard Injury Control Research Center. Accessible at 
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/research/hicrc/firearms-research/guns-and-death/index.html 
15 Jacobson V. Massachusetts, 197 US 11(1905).Justice Harlan, writing for the 7-2 majority, remarked “But it is equally 
true that in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the 
individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be 
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand.” As it was plainly established by the 
high incidence of gun violence in the US and by the randomness with which an attack can occur – whether it be at an 
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First, the paper will follow the style of the majority opinion of Heller by examining the text of 
the Second Amendment to decipher its meaning. Then, it will engage in a discussion of “originalism” 
within the Heller majority and dissenting opinions, questioning the methodology with which each side 
arrived at their decision. The third section deals explicitly with the concept of “popular 
constitutionalism” and the enshrinement of a new right. The final section surmises that, because gun 
ownership must be regulated for the benefit of the public at large, there must be an alternative legal 
strategy to circumvent the radical redefinition of the meaning of the Second Amendment without being 
struck down as an unconstitutional limitation on this new individual right to guns.  
Part I A: The Second Amendment and its Clauses 
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”16 
 As eloquently stated by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, “It cannot be 
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect.”17 The Second Amendment 
is composed of two separate clauses: the “adverbial clause” (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free State”) and the “main clause” (“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
shall not be infringed.” The “adverbial clause” functions as an “absolute construction” clause, 
functioning to link the separate clauses together to create one cohesive sentence by demonstrating 
causation between the first clause and the second clause.18 Thus, the Second Amendment can be 
reworded as a single sentence: “The people comprising the membership of their State’s well-regulated 
Militia cannot have their right to keep and bear Arms infringed upon to ensure the security of their free 
State.” To remove the adverbial clause is to distort the meaning of the sentence. According to an amici 
curiae brief filed by the “Professors of Linguistics” in support of the District in Heller, if the “absolute 
construction expresses the cause for the main clause’s prohibition,” then removal of the absolute 
elementary school, movie theater, or a place known for facilitating drug exchanges – it is necessary to protect any and all 
potential victims, essentially the entire populace, from the loss of the most cherished right – the right of an individual to 
have their lives – at the hands of an “Arm.” 
16 United States Constitution, Amendment II  
17 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174 (1803). 
18 “Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English. Dennis E. Baron, Ph.D., Richard W. Bailey, Ph.D. and Jeffrey P. Kaplan, 
Ph.D. in Support of Petitioners,” District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290)  
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construction would remove the “cause” from the “cause and effect” chain, effectively asserting “the fact 
that a well regulated Militia is necessary to the security of a free State is not the reason that the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.”19 Just as the Preamble to the Constitution 
informs the purpose and context of the Constitution, the “preamble” or “adverbial clause” of the Second 
Amendment informs the purpose and context of the main clause. 
 Eugene Volokh, on the other hand, argues against the normal reading of the Second Amendment 
by averring that the “justification” (Militia) clause is not a condition on the “operative clause” (Arms) 
because “all individual rights that belong to each person, not just to members of the militia – ‘the people’ 
seems to refer to people generally” in other Amendments within the Bill of Rights, specifically the First 
Amendment.20 Nelson Lund asserts the justification clause reflects more of the Framers’ fear of intrusive 
Government action as a result of standing armies; consequently, the Militia clause was included as a 
“rhetorical respect” for the special place reserved for Militias in the “traditional republican” values of 
independence.21 Going even further than Volokh and Lund, William Van Alstyne maintains that 
“Militia” is a recommendation for the States and an encouragement for the people of a state to join its 
militia, but the express guarantee of the Second Amendment is the right of “the people” to Arms (“It is 
this right that is expressly identified as "the right" that is not to be ("shall not be") infringed) and are 
protected against Congressional interference with the enjoyment this right.22 
 Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion in Heller, interprets the Second Amendment’s “prefatory” 
(Militia) clause as informing the “operative” clause (Arms) “but does not limit or expand the scope of 
the operative clause.”23 While he muses that it is “entirely sensible” that the prefatory clause 
“announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia,”24 he 
concludes that the Militia clause can be removed without disturbing the central component of the 
19 “Brief for Professors of Linguistics” at page 11. 
20 From Eugene Volokh’s article “The Commonplace Second Amendment,” published in the New York University Law 
Review, Vol.793 (1998) at page 3. (Hereafter Volokh, “Commonplace”) 
21 From Nelson Lund’s article  “The Past and Future of the Individual's Right to Arms,” 31 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 35-36 (1996) 
22 William W. Van Alstyne’s "The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms," Duke Law Journal, Vol 43, at page 
1242. (Hereafter Van Alstyne “Personal Right”) 
23 Heller, slip op., at Majority 4. 
24 Heller, slip op., at Majority 26 
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Second Amendment – that the operative clause can stand alone and is unambiguous in meaning. To 
arrive at this conclusion, Scalia invokes Volokh’s aforementioned conception of the meaning of “the 
people” in his definition of the people as “unambiguously refer[ing] to all members of the political 
community, not an unspecified subset.”25 From there, he determines that the Constitution usually (with 
the exception of three provisions) refers to “the people” in the context of granting an “individual” right. 
Thus, the Second Amendment does not endorse a “collective” right to arms through Militia service as 
reserved to those eligible to serve in a militia but, rather, an “individual” right” to “keep and bear arms” 
for nonmilitary purposes.  
From this division of the two clauses, Scalia asserts that the Second Amendment was codified to 
reiterate a preexisting, common-law right: the guarantee for all people to keep and bear arms for the 
purpose of self-defense without fear of disarmament by the Federal Government. The inclusion of the 
Militia clause, then, becomes suspect and superfluous in this new light. Returning to Chief Justice 
Marshall’s aforementioned statement about each clause in the Constitution sustaining a purpose, the 
Framers would not have included the Militia clause without a specific purpose. Scalia hypothesizes that 
this purpose was to “secure the ideal of a citizen militia.”26 Logically, then, the “ideal of a citizen militia” 
informs the use of the phrase “the people.”  
Since “the people” at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification eligible to join a militia 
were usually white, able-bodied males, this would limit the scope of the Second Amendment’s right to 
“keep and bear arms” to a subset of the population if the Militia clause were given effect. Generally 
speaking, the modern day equivalent of the “militia” is the National Guard27. Thus, applying “the 
people” to the National Guard would still lead to a select group eligible to bear arms: almost 87% male 
and 74% white.28 If the definition of “the people” is independent of the Militia clause, a “Fourth 
Amendment” reading of the Second Amendment29, the exercise of an individual’s Second Amendment 
25 Heller, slip op., at Majority 6 
26 Heller, slip op., at Majority 26 
27 Akhil Reed Amar’s “Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning,” published in the Harvard Law Review, Vol 122. (2008) 
at page 166. (Hereafter Amar, “Heller, HLR”) 
28 The Army’s self-described composition, available at 
http://www.armyg1.army.mil/hr/docs/demographics/FY03ArmyReserveGuard.pdf 
29 Akhil, “Heller, HLR” at page 167: “A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of 
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rights would the class of persons comprising “the political community;” however, this would be little 
improvement to the expanse of Second Amendment rights since most persons living in the United States 
at the time of the adoption were not considered “people,” like women or slaves.  
Part I B: The Second Amendment and Preambles 
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, decries Scalia’s interpretation of the Militia clause as 
erroneous in that it motivates the text using backwards induction: analysis begins with the operative 
clause, establishes the operative clause’s meaning, then proceeds to the preamble “to ensure that our 
reading of the operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose,”30 a method that Stevens 
insists is “not how this Court ordinarily reads such texts, and it is not how the preamble would have 
been viewed at the time the Amendment was adopted.”31 Scalia backwards induction allows him to treat 
the preamble as superfluous by firmly establishing the operative first, ignoring the argument (and 
standard interpretation in the 18th century as well as today) that the preamble provides context for the 
operative clause. In what Saul Cornell refers to as the “Cheshire Cat Rule of Construction – now you see 
the preamble, now you don’t,”32 Scalia decrees that a preamble is a necessary to determine the meaning 
of the operative only when an ambiguity in the operative merits a resolution plausibly found in the 
preamble.33 Eugene Volokh’s “modest discovery is that the Second Amendment belongs to a large family 
of similarly structured constitutional provisions: they command a certain thing while at the same time 
explaining their reasons”34 is used to found Scalia’s conclusion that the preamble is merely a 
justification, not a purpose, for the individual right to bear arms.35  
Both Volokh and Scalia, however, cite Joseph Story’s treatise, “Commentaries on the Constitution 
of the United States” (1833), to assert the existence of an individual right to arms apart from militia 
persons — most of whom are not in the militia, have never been in the militia, and can never be in the militia — to keep 
and bear arms shall not be infringed.” 
30 Heller, slip op., at Majority 5 
31 Heller, slip op., at Stevens Dissent 8 
32 Saul Cornell’s “Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: ‘Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,’” 56 UCLA 
Law Review 1095 (2009) at page 1107 (hereafter referred to as Cornell, “Boss”) 
33 Heller, slip op., at Majority 5, footnote 4. 
34 Volokh “Commonplace” at page 6 
35 Heller, slip op., at Majority 3 
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service,36 yet disregard the fact that Story contended that “the importance of examining the preamble, 
for the purposes of expounding the language of a statute, has long been felt, and universally conceded 
in all juridical discussions. It is an added maxim in the ordinary course of the administration of 
justice…”37 Story’s view, however, would advance the Stevens interpretation of the preamble more than 
it would Scalia’s.38 For example, Scalia would have the Preamble to the United States Constitution 
removed without consequence to meaning to the remainder of the document39. Stevens, instead, would 
aver that the Preamble to the US Constitution informs and frames the purpose of the Constitution as a 
whole; if preambles had no meaning, they would not have been written. 
Part I C: Federalism and the Second Amendment 
 Scalia acknowledges that “during the 1788 ratification debates, the fear that the federal 
government would disarm the people in order to impose rule through a standing army or select militia 
was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric.”40 The Bill of Rights was inserted into the Constitution to “limit 
federal power”41 through guarantee of certain rights and the maintenance of state sovereignty, 
attempting to assuage Antifederalist fears. The Second Amendment’s Militia provision served as one of 
the “devices to keep the Union together”42 by performing a balancing of military power between state 
and federal government, enshrining the doctrine of federalism. These federalist concerns are at the heart 
of the Second Amendment; resultantly, they cannot be discarded whilst still achieving a plausible 
interpretation of the Second Amendment’s meaning. In asserting state sovereignty through control of 
36 Heller, slip op., at Majority 20 
37 Joseph Story’s “Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States” at 459 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1833).  
38 Joseph Story was erroneously referenced in Heller’s “Post-Ratification Commentary” section to serve as evidentiary 
support for Second Amendment as a personal guarantee to arms unrelated to the militia. Using his Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States (1833), Heller Slip op. at Maj 35 the majority surmised that Story clearly showed that the 
Second Amendment, as informed by the English Bill of Rights, guaranteed and was intended to guarantee citizens a right 
independent of Militia. As William Merkel writes in “The District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia’s Perverse 
Sense of Originalism” at page 362, “This is patently false and can only be explained on grounds of obstinate ignorance or 
deliberate falsehood. Story’s discussion of the Second Amendment in his Commentaries is focused exclusively on the militia 
dependency of the right, and the perils confronting the right on account of rising apathy respecting militia duty.” Thus, it 
becomes truly puzzling how the Court arrived at this conclusion. 
39 In Cruikshank, supra note 109, at 92 U.S. 550, the Court considers the preamble as a list of the purposes for which they 
“ordained and established the government of the United States, and defined its powers by a Constitution, which they 
adopted as its fundamental law, and made its rule of action.” Obviously, then, the Preamble informs the purpose of the 
remainder of the Constitution, making it essential to a correct understanding. 
40 Heller, slip op., at Majority 26 
41 Richard A Epstein’s “A Structural Interpretation of the Second Amendment: Why Heller Is (Probably) Wrong on 
Originalist Grounds” 59 Syracuse L Rev 171 (2008) at page 4. (Hereafter Epstein, “Probably Wrong”) 
42 Epstein, “A Structural Interpretation…” at page 174 
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state militias, the state retained the ability to adapt their militias “to local opinions and concerns” as a 
result of the Second Amendment’s federalist scheme “of decentralized decision making.”43 
 Dissecting the method Scalia used to assert a wider range of “the people” than would be 
considered in 1791 as “the people” in the context of ability to serve in “the militia” illustrates a 
propensity to define the phrases in the Second Amendment by comparing them to other, similar phrases 
utilized throughout the Constitution but with a more general consensus concerning their meaning. His 
“Fourth Amendment Analysis” of the Second Amendment leads him to assert that, because the Fourth 
Amendment is structured similarly to the Second Amendment and employs the phrase “the people” in 
its text, “the people” referenced in the Fourth Amendment must be the same “people” of the Second 
Amendment.  
Utilizing this logic, the ambiguity of “Militia” should first attempt to be resolved given the 
accepted connotation of “militia” in other parts of the Constitution, namely Article I, § VIII44 and Article 
II, §2, Clause 1.45 The Guaranty Clause46 furthers a notion that effective and powerful state militias 
existed at the time of the Constitution’s framing, implying that “domestic violence,” resulting from an 
invasion of one state’s militia into the territory of another state, is first an issue to be dealt with by the 
States and, if the State fails, it is to be protected via government protection. In combination with the 
declaration in Article I, § X, Clause III,47 which presumes state militias were able to efficaciously engage 
in war with other entities without the assistance of the government, “a well regulated militia” detailed 
in the Second Amendment can be presumed to have “a close relationship with constitutional 
structures”48 of state militia detailed in the aforementioned clauses, indicating that militias were 
43 Wilkinson, “Of Guns, Abortion” at page 315 
44 United States Constitution; Article I, Section VIII: “The Congress shall have Power ... To provide for the calling forth the 
Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, 
and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, 
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to 
the discipline prescribed by Congress.” 
45 United States Constitution; Article II, Section II, Clause I: “"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States” 
46 United States Constitution; Article IV, Section 4: “"The United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a 
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or 
of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." 
47United States Constitution; Article I, Section X, Clause III:  “"No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ... engage in 
War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” 
48 Epstein, “Probably Wrong” at pages 4-5 
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organized and relatively powerful.  
The first of the aforementioned Constitutional clauses regarding state militias delineates “proper 
regulation of the militia” by endowing Congress with the power to oblige state militias to engage in 
active service if Congress perceives a difficulty in suppressing rebellions, invasions, or in executing 
federal law; additionally, it prescribes a “discipline” for militia training to be overseen by the state. The 
sum of this clause is to engender a semblance of uniformity in the construction and training of state 
militias in the event that their assistance is needed to bolster the federal government. The second militia 
clause allows the president to be Commander and Chief the “coherent force” as embodied by the 
aggregation of all state militias, each trained in accordance with the Congress’s prescribed “uniform 
discipline” per Article I, § VIII, for the purposes of National defense. A careful analysis of the 
aforementioned clauses elucidates a federal structure within control and utilization of the state militias. 
A federalist separation of state and local authority is delineated with Congress’s power to control state 
militias is limited to instances when the militia is needed for national defense and reserved to the states 
otherwise to limit federal power; Congress may determine the “discipline” but actual training of state 
militia members is a state power. A federalist separation of checks and balances between the branches 
is given through a limitation on Executive action, only allowing the Executive to command the state 
militias provided Congress first summons the militias.  
Federalism generates limitations on federal power, and the Militia Clauses limit the degree with 
which the national government can limit state sovereignty in the realm of militia organization. The 
Second Amendment, Professor Richard Epstein argues, operates to congeal fundamental right of the 
States to provide for their own protection because the “militia is so important that the federal 
government is now under a duty to steer a wide berth from any actions that would involve its 
regulation”49 through Second Amendment guarantees. Ergo, the authority of the state to construct and 
conduct its militia in a manner which best serves its interest its own self-defense is a byproduct of the 
federalist structure that defers to the state as sovereign and able operate and legislate in accordance to 
49 Epstein, “Probably Wrong” at pg. 6 
Page | 10 
 
                                                     
 
 
the will of its people provided that they do not interfere with a right explicitly enumerated to another 
branch by the Constitution or a right explicitly forbidden to be in control of the states per the 
Constitution.  
DC’s legislature, in exercising its right to determine the best laws to suit the needs of its populace, 
passed a local law restricting the ease of access to handguns for the welfare of its populace that is 
exemplary of the federalist system’s division of power - allowing states and local governments to engage 
in legislative experimentation and innovation to solve the unique problems facing their area.50 
However, in discarding the federalist origins of the Second Amendment, the Court also discards the 
structures implemented to maintain state sovereignty in the wake of a new, centralized government that 
incited a need for the Second Amendment at the United States’ inception. In short, to abandon the 
federalist basis of the Second Amendment is to abandon the Amendment as a whole such that the main 
clause loses its meaning as well; therefore, the Court’s catastrophic interpretation of the original 
meaning of the Second Amendment disfigures the constitutionally-mandated balance of power between 
State, Local, and Federal governments restricting the range of legislative action that a state or local 
government may take to protect its citizens from crime. Heller is demonstrative of the Court entering 
and tampering with the legislative arena, especially when they consciously acknowledge the true 
purpose of the Second Amendment yet render it irrelevant nonetheless.51 
The Court also separates the phrase “to keep and bear arms” into “to keep arms” and “to bear 
arms” as a mechanism to justify a non-military meaning to the clause; they reason that, while “to bear 
arms” is military in connotation, “to keep arms” must refer to a private, individual right apart from the 
collective right to “bear arms” in the Militia.52 This is another perversion of the text of the Amendment. 
50 Wilkinson, “Of Guns, Abortion” at pg. 318 
51 Heller, slip op., at Majority 24; “There are many reasons why the militia was thought to be ‘necessary to the security of a 
free state…Third, when able bodied men of a nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to resist 
tyranny.” This recalls the federalist origin of the Second Amendment – to permit the States to have a Militia in order to 
protect themselves against any potential tyranny imposed by the standing army of the Federal government. In Heller, 
though, the Court is acting as a tyrant, usurping the will of the people and the original meaning of the Second Amendment 
such that their reformulated conception comports with a political agenda. It seems incredulous that the Court could admit 
a federalist origin to the Second Amendment but disregard it without stating any plausible rationale for such an action. 
52 Heller, slip op., at Majority 9: “’Keep arms’ was simply a common way of referring to possessing arms for militiamen 
and everyone else.” 
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Instead of interpreting the text as written, Scalia opts to interpret the text as it best fits his personal 
conception of a natural, inherent individual right to own a firearm outside the context of armed, well-
regulated militia service. Accordingly, he conceives of the Second Amendment supporting a libertarian 
ideology encompassing an individual right to liberty (bear arms for protection of oneself) and property 
(the right to keep arms as a personal and private possession).53 In a normal reading of the clause (re: 
wherein “keep” and “bear” are unitary), these assertions would be implausible to preserve. 
Justice Stevens contests separating the clauses and determining the individual meaning of each 
clause, ironically, quoting a prior Scalia dissent: “The Court does not appear to grasp the distinction 
between how a word can be used and how it is ordinarily used.”54 A preponderance of evidence from 
the colonial era to the period surrounding the ratification of the Constitution and the Nation’s early 
years supports the Stevens supposition (that “Arms” is military in meaning and the Second Amendment 
concerns militia, not private, weaponry usages), with over 90% of surviving recorded uses from that 
time span adhering to Stevens’ conception of the Amendment’s meaning.55 Again, the Professors of 
Linguistics take issues with the Majority’s decision to dilute the phrase in to two expressions, remarking, 
after an exhaustive investigation regarding the “idiomatic usage” of “keep and bear arms” at the time 
of the drafting and passing of the Second Amendment, “Given the Second Amendment’s purpose and 
use of the idiom “bear Arms,” the natural meaning of the adjacent word “keep,” when used in reference 
to “arms,” is the personal possession or public control of arms (weapons of offence, or armour of 
defense) for service in a well regulated militia.”56 
To fault Scalia’s syntactical deconstruction of the Second Amendment as being wholly incorrect 
on its face (without considering his noticeably flawed employment of history, to be discussed later) is 
unfair: were the meaning of the Second Amendment wholly unambiguous, then Heller would not have 
survived long enough to be heard before the Supreme Court. But, since no one but the people alive in 
1791 could articulate what the “public meaning” of the Amendment was at the time of its creation, and 
53 Amar, “Heller, HLR” at pg189 
54 Heller, slip op., at Majority.11 (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
55 “Heller as Hubris, and how McDonald v. City of Chicago May Well Change the Constitutional World as We Know It” 
William Merkel, Santa Clara Law Review (2010) at page1229. (Hereafter Merkel, “Hubris”) 
56 Brief for Professors of Linguistics at pg. 27 
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it is assumed that all of the people alive in 1791 are, by now, dead, the meaning of the Second 
Amendment can always be contested. Thus, it cannot be definitively ruled out that Scalia’s mangled 
interpretation is incorrect; there will always be a slight chance that the people of 1791 understood their 
language and idiomatic phrases as poorly as Scalia does in the present. Were the people of 1791 
confronted the circumstances of the present – where military-grade weapons can be owned by the 
average citizen and some States’ concealed-carry laws permit handguns to carried at all times in all 
places – would they interpret the Second Amendment in the same manner as they would when the most 
palpable threat was the federal government’s standing army instead of their neighbor? Mark Tushnet, 
to this effect, avers that “we cannot infer from what the term would have been understood to mean 
were the background facts different, as they inevitably are.”57 Thus, to arrive at a better understanding 
of the Second Amendment, a new “Insurrectionist Theory” is devised to reconcile the past/present 
discord in the “public meaning” of “arms” in 1791 and its meaning in 2012. 
Part I D: The Second Amendment and a New “Insurrectionist Theory” 
This paper proffers the idea that the Second Amendment is most easily read as supporting a right 
to insurrection. The brand of “Insurrectionist Theory” advanced by this paper recognizes the Second 
Amendment, with respect to its historical context, was an attempt to assuage the Anti-Federalist 
“concerns raised during the ratification of the Constitution that the power of Congress to disarm the 
state militias and create a national standing army posed an intolerable threat to the sovereignty of the 
several States.”58 Concurrently, the “Insurrectionist Theory” forwarded by this paper departs from 
Justice Stevens supposition of a purely “Statist” interpretation of a “militia” enunciated in his Heller 
dissent, averring that the militia’s purpose, aside from providing the state and its citizens protection 
from a potentially despotic central government with a powerful army, was to quash insurrections within 
the state as well – to temper anti-Union ideas with violence for the purposes of aiding transition to the 
form of government as described in the (then newly-formed) Constitution. Thomas Jefferson, for 
57 Mark Tushnet’s “Heller and the New Originalism,” published in Ohio State Law Journal, Vol 62:609 (2008) at page 
622. (Hereafter, Tushnet “Originalism”) 
58 Heller, slip op., at Stevens Dissent 2831 
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example, found the Second Amendment to be both a right and responsibility of the people “to keep and 
bear arms collectively” through the militia structure “as a guarantor of a republican revolution.”59 
Furthermore, “Federalist 28” asserts a necessity for the National government to quash insurrection 
spurred by a whole State through violence, if required by the given circumstances, for the purposes of 
preserving the new form government and for the people of a state, in the event that “persons entrusted 
with supreme power” within their state “betray[ed] their constituents,” to “rush tumultuously to arms, 
without system, without resource; except in their courage and despair.”60 
Unlike Joshua Horwitz and Casey Anderson’s blanket classification of all “Insurrectionists” 
attempting to “legitimize values that are fundamentally hostile to the survival of democracy not only as 
we have known it but also as our founding fathers knew it” to enshrine a “virtually unlimited” right for 
all people to “keep and bear” any firearm they so desire for the purposes of “hold[ing] tyranny at bay.”61 
As previously shown, the Founding Fathers, although not explicitly condoning violent government 
overthrow, advocated at least some degree of violent insurrection among the citizenry in the event of 
perceived tyranny of the government. This, however, does not preclude the existence of the citizenry in 
arms for the purposes of militia, especially when considering the role of militias in “the course of the 
late war” wherein “in times of insurrection, or invasion, would be natural and proper that the militia 
of a neighboring State should be marched into another, to resist a common enemy, or to guard the 
republic against the violence of faction or sedition.”62 
Expanding outwards from the dissenters in Heller’s restricted definition of the feasible or 
imaginable purposes for a militia during the time of the second Amendment’s framing, new potential 
meanings for “militia” and “the right to keep and bear arms” by the “people” begin to arise. This 
“Insurrectionist Theory” posits that a “well regulated militia” facilitated the right of the people to 
conduct a formalized insurrection through the militia’s structure, mandating that arms must be kept at 
all times by the “people,” able-bodied white males at the founding of the Constitution, to effectively 
59 Anderson, Casey and Horwitz, Joshua. Guns, Democracy, and the Insurrectionist Idea. The University of Michigan Press. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan. 2009. Pg. 105. (Hereafter Anderson, Horwitz, Insurrectionist) 
60 “Federalist 28,” Alexander Hamilton (page 162) 
61 Anderson, Horwitz, Insurrectionist at pg. 80. 
62 “Federalist 26,” Alexander Hamilton (170) 
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“revolt against tyranny, without condoning an open-ended right to engage in rebellion, civil war, or 
cop-killing.”63 The latter is a right codified both with and without the confines of an official State militia 
and is a right to self-defense in terms of maintenance of a “free State,” with “free State” referring to 
both “security of a free polity”64 and to the individual State.  
It should not be assumed that this brand of “Insurrectionist Theory” supports any proposition 
that the Second Amendment meaning finds an individual “right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to 
use arms in defense of hearth and home.”65 Moreover, because of the subjectivity with which a people 
can determine that a government is tyrannical, the (overwhelming consensus) that the people are not 
restricted in their ability to choose those that govern their locality, the current stability of the United 
States government and of State governments, the existence of a Militia in the form of the National Guard, 
and the lack of the term “self-defense” in the text of the Amendment, it can be inferred that the 
Amendment protects a means of self-defense (through the Militia) but not private acts of self-defense 
against other members of the population. The result of this analysis is that the Second Amendment, as a 
consequence of its historical grounding in a “republican vision of a militia prepared to defend against 
government tyranny,”66 is “not dead, just comatose.”67 Akin to the nonsensicality of an application of 
the Third Amendment in modern society68, the Second Amendment is a relic of history and cannot be 
read as endorsing the Court’s interpretation of the “core right” to individual self-defense in the present 
day through its text. As Richard Posner bluntly states, “There are few more antiquated constitutional 
provisions than the Second Amendment.”69 Bolstering this contention is Timothy McVeigh, famous for 
63 Darrell A.H. Miller’s “Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-bound Second Amendment,” published in the Columbia Law 
Review, Vol 109:1278 at page 1322. (Hereafter, Miller, “Smut”) 
64 Heller, slip op., at Majority 28. 
65 Heller, slip op., at Majority 53 
66 Reva Siegel’s “Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller,” published in the Harvard Law Review 
Vol 122:191 at page 239. (Hereafter Siegel, “Dead or Alive”) 
67 Miller, “Smut” at pg1313 
68 The Third Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any 
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” Since the American 
Revolution, “quartering” has not been a matter of concern; therefore, it is ludicrous to point to an amendment that has no 
pertinent rationale given the conditions of modern society as the foundation of a “fundamental” right to own a handgun or 
any other weapon asynchronous with the “arms” in use at that time. Van Alstyne in “The Second Amendment and the 
Personal Right to Arms” (1994) argues that the deficit of “useful modern case law” for the Second Amendment is that 
“there has been no occasion to develop such law. So much is true only of the Third Amendment.”(1239) Perhaps this is 
because the Second Amendment has the same amount of relevance to modern society as does the Third. 
69 Judge Richard A Posner, “In Defense of Looseness,” published in The New Republic on August 27, 2008. Accessible at  
http://www.tnr.com/article/books/defense-looseness (hereafter Posner, “Looseness”) 
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the Oklahoma City Bombings, an adherent to a “Strong Insurrectionist Theory”70 with a profound 
paranoia of Government and of Governmental usurpation of his “fundamental” rights.71 
Part II A: Historical Perversion as a Conduit for Discretionary Judicial Interpretation 
Given the same series of 27 words, three commas, and one period, it is almost incredulous that 
the Majority and the Dissent arrived at such starkly different conclusions about the “meaning” of the 
Second Amendment. This discrepancy stems, in part, from the judicial ideologies invoked in the opinions 
of the dissenters and the majority. To support their claimed meaning of the Second Amendment, each 
side consulted historical texts yet chose selectively among available texts in order to arrive at their 
decisions. Whether the Majority opinion methodology is considered “new originalism,”72 “result-
oriented law office history,”73 “constitutional lawmaking through constitutional politics,”74 “triumph 
of originalism…[or] an exposé of original intent,”75 “original public meaning,”76 “plain-meaning 
originalism,”77 “originalism stripped of the original understanding of how a constitutional provision 
should be interpreted,”78 to “[amend] the constitution through judicial fiat,”79 or as “the most explicitly 
and self-consciously originalist opinion in the history of the Supreme Court,”80 it is clear that arriving 
at that their conclusion rested the supposition that “historical truth and historical meaning is 
ascertainable,”81 a supposition especially tenuous in cases where constitutional interpretation cannot 
70 Miller, “Smut” at pg1313; Discussing the lack of standardization of “Insurrectionist Theory,” Miller explains a 
discrepancy in “degree and analytical rigor” of various “Insurrectionist Theories” that roughly formulate a scale wherein 
the strongest “Insurrectionists” adhere to a Second Amendment reading sanctioning use of guns anywhere at any point in 
time (since the Government can be oppressive at a given moment) and the weakest contend “only a legally enforceable 
right to possess a means to resist tyrannical government; it says nothing about a legal right to deploy those means or the 
military efficacy of those means.” This paper’s version of the “Insurrectionist Theory” is closer to the latter on the 
“Insurrectionist” spectrum. 
71 Anderson, Horwitz, Insurrectionist at pgs. 17, 2, 223 
68 Mark Tushnet’s “Heller and the Critique of Judgment” The Supreme Court Review, Vol. 2008, No. 1 (2008), pp. 61-87 
at page 63. (Hereafter Tushnet “Critique”) 
73Sanford Levinson to Balkinization, Some Preliminary Reflections on Heller, http://balkin. blogspot.com/2008/06/some-
preliminary-reflections-on-heller.html 
74 Siegel, “Dead or Alive” at pg194 
75 Wilkinson, “Of Guns, Abortion” at pg. 256 
76 Lawrence B. Solum, “District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism,” Northwestern University Law Review No. 2, 923 
(2009) at page 947. (Hereafter Solum, “Originalism”) 
77 Saul Cornell, “Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller,” Ohio State Law 
Journal. (2008) at page 626. (Hereafter, Cornell, “Originalism on Trial”) 
78 Posner, “Looseness” at pg. 4 
79 Nelson Lund, “The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence,” published in UCLA Law Review, Vol. 56, 
No. 5, June 2009, pp. 1343-1376 at page 1344. (Hereafter Lund, “Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence”) 
80 Cass Sunstein, “Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold,” Harvard Law Review. Vol 122 (2008) at page 
246. (Hereafter: Sunstein, “Griswold”) 
81 William Merkel, “The District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism,” Lewis & Clark 
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possibly result in a singular, conventional understanding of the historical record. If the historical record 
cannot be read neutrally (in that interpretation of the record can serve to support either side of an 
argument), then the Court is presented with a discretionary choice and should practice judicial restraint, 
deferring interpretation of the legislative body instead of rewriting law.82 Though Justice Stevens, 
employing “Old” Originalism, is viewed by most historians as employing a more correct understanding 
of the Second Amendment’s meaning83, it is by no means a neutral interpretation of history.84 Heller, 
on both sides, brilliantly illustrates judges dressing up like historians to justify their personal opinions.85 
Neither Justice meets the standards of historical scholarship mandated by any form of originalism.86 
 Professor Lawrence Solum argues that there are three senses of meaning in language: 1) 
semantic (linguistic meaning), 2) applicative (implications, consequences), and 3) teleological 
(purpose/function). He determines that the discrepancy in Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens’ opinions 
arises from a fundamental difference in interpretation of language: Justice Scalia utilizes a “semantic 
sense” to arrive at a recovery of the Second Amendment’s meaning while Stevens prefers a “teleological 
sense” in his assertion that nonmilitary use was not part of the Amendment’s meaning.87 These 
disagreements on linguistic meaning lead to clashing interpretation of the Amendment’s clauses and 
different interpretations of relationships between clauses in the Justices’ inquiries. Solum also 
hypothesizes that the discrepancy in understanding could be a ramification of the larger jurisprudential 
Law Review (2009) at page 380. (Hereafter, Merkel, “Scalia Perverse”) 
82 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 (1984) (explaining that, in cases of 
ambiguity, deference is given to the interpretation of the agency with whom Congress has entrusted enforcement of the 
statue) via Wilkinson, “Of Guns, Abortion” at pg. 272 
83 Sunstein, “Griswold” at pg. 256 
84 Nathan R. Kozuskanich, “Pennsylvania, the Militia, and the Second Amendment,”  The Pennsylvania Magazine of History 
and Biography, Vol. 133, No. 2 (Apr., 2009) at page 122, regarding the use of Pennsylvania’s arms stature by both sides in 
Heller to selectively read the Constitution and Second Amendment for their individual, ideological aims. “In the Heller 
case, both the majority and minority opinions used Pennsylvania to make their point, and both sides had their history 
wrong.” This furthers the notion that the ambiguous historical record is pushed in such a way as to endorse one 
discretionary judicial interpretation over another, resulting in a decision that was 1) erroneously left to the discretionary 
devices of the Judges and 2) should have given deference to legislature and legislative ability under the federalist ability to 
pass local-issue-tailored laws. 
85 Sanford Levinson, “United States: Assessing Heller,” published in I • CON, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 316 – 328, at page 325 
“Mark Tushnet once famously, and caustically, referred to the notion of the ‘lawyer as astrophysicist,’ by which he meant 
the tendency of very smart lawyers to believe that a weekend’s immersion in the relevant materials would enable them to 
hold their own as experts with any poor soul who had actually spent years earning, say, a Ph.D. in history (let alone 
astrophysics).” (Hereafter, Levinson, “Assessing Heller”) 
86 Cornell, “Originalism on Trial” at pg. 627 
87 Solum, “Originalism” at pg. 941 
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debate between formalists and instrumentalists.88 Either way, a distillation of Solum’s argument reveals 
an overarching difference between the manners with which judicial methodology informs an opinion. 
With respect to Heller, this battle over the meaning of the Second Amendment pits Old Originalism/” 
“Original Intentions Originalism,” embodied by Stevens’ technique of analyzing the Framers’ intentions 
alongside other relevant historical documents, against New Originalism/”Original Meaning 
Originalism,” as elucidated by Justice Scalia’s approach to Heller89. 
Part II B: Scalia and Original Intent in Heller 
Justice Stevens, employing “Old Originalism” is generally considered to have authored a more 
“originalist” opinion than Scalia: “Justice Scalia’s majority opinion employed original public meaning 
originalism, while Justice Stevens’ dissent used the more traditional method of originalism which focuses 
on the intent of the Founders.”90 It seems as if Stevens employed originalism accidentally; since most of 
his opinion was dedicated to battling Scalia on the historical basis of his opinion and what a proper 
reading of the Second Amendment should be, he presented almost no arguments in support of the 
District or a need for a gun ban.91 Regardless of intent to proliferate originalist judicial ideology, the 
sum effect was a universal employment of originalism by the opinions yet divergent results.  
As previously mentioned, the approach employed in Heller resolved to unearth the “original 
public meaning” of the Constitution as it was understood by the people that voted for its ratification 
through their state legislatures, public forum debates, and other documents that provided context for 
the drafting of the Second Amendment. In his analysis, Justice Scalia quotes state constitutions drafted 
prior to the U.S. Constitution, other provisions of the Constitution, dictionary definitions from that era, 
88 Solum, “Originalism” at pg. 958 (also defined as “textualists v.purposivists,” meaning that legal content is constrained 
by the words and phrases comprising a text versus the belief that the meaning of legal rules is derived from the function of 
that rule.) 
89 His interpretation of the text of the Second Amendment is “guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to 
be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical 
meaning.’ United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931).” Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570, (2008). Slip 
of Majority at 3.  
90 Cornell, “Originalism on Trial” at pg. 625 
91 Sunstein, “Griswold” at pg. 250 (Remarking that none of the Justices approached the Second Amendment from a moral 
perspective of the people at the time of the framing, Sunstein summarizes Scalia’s originalism as “distinctive” and 
“ascendant,” Stevens’ dissent as originalist but also with emphasis on precedent, traditions, and judicial deference to 
legislators, and Breyer’s dissent as a “plea for balancing” with pragmatic as well as originalist elements.” 
originalist elements. 
Page | 18 
 
                                                     
 
 
and a myriad of sources from 19th Century discussing constitutional interpretation, an 1871 edition of 
an English treatise92 discussing statutory construction,  the Blackstone Commentaries on the English Bill 
of rights, the English Bill of Rights, Eugene Volokh93 an, and the notion of “natural right” to support his 
position. Problematic, however, is that he fails to cite Founding-era United States sources for much of 
his evidentiary support. Furthermore, no historical evidence is cited to support his claim that “original 
meaning” implies firearms “common at any given time.”94  
This lack of founding-era sources cannot be construed to bestow “original meaning” to the 
Second Amendment through non-founding era sources; Justice Scalia’s constructs his result-oriented 
majority opinion on a selective interpretation of history, favoring “atypical texts” like Dissent of the 
Minority of Pennsylvania95 and declares them “influential” for their time while decreeing that text 
typically considered influential,” like Benjamin Oliver’s Rights of an American Citizen, as 
“unrepresentative.”96 Since the majority of his evidentiary support stems from Civil-War era, Post-Civil 
War, international documents, and a selective reading of influential scholars, William Merkel contends 
that most of his objections to the Scalia’s Heller opinion stem from “the fact that his allegedly history-
driven method depends on numerous false claims.”97Even historians that find face validity in original 
public meaning as a constitutional interstation philosophy, like prominent legal and founding era 
historian David Konig, believe Scalia’s opinion to be disingenuous as a consequence of its use of the 19th 
century to support his preferred reading of an Amendment written and conceived in the 18th century.98 
The lack of historical basis for a historically-driven interpretation leads historian of the founding period 
Jack Cornell to remark, “Such an approach is intellectually dishonest and suggests that Justice Scalia’s 
92 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789. 
93 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789 
94 Lund, “Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence" at pg1364 
95 Heller, slip op., at Majority 34 
96 Heller, slip op., at Majority37 “We have found only one early 19th-century commentator who clearly conditioned the 
right to keep and bear arms upon service in the militia—and he recognized that the prevailing view was to the contrary.” 
97 Merkel, “Hubris” at pg. 1225 (Merkel supports this allegation based on the Brief of Amici Curia Jack N. Rakove, et al. in 
support of Petitioners at 9-13, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), signed by over a dozen 
“leading eighteenth-century specialists” that criticize the “private rights” interpretation of the Second Amendment. 
98 David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture of 
Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA Law Review. 1295 (2009). (Koing accepts the “public meaning” 
perspective for the sake of argument, not indicative that it has actual validity). 
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brand of plain-meaning originalism is little more than a smoke screen for his own political agenda.”99 
Originalism, as defined by Justice Scalia in his work A Matter of Interpretation and first 
enunciated during a speech at The Catholic University of America, “treats the Constitution like a statute, 
and gives it the meaning that its words were understood to bear at the time they were promulgated…I 
[as a textualist and originalist] take the words as they were promulgated to the people of the United 
States, and what is the fairly understood meaning of those words.”100 Originalism, in theory, is an 
objective approach, limiting room for judicial interpretation resulting from personal beliefs, which 
allows a black-and-white criterion for review and invalidation of legislation: either a law fits with the 
original meaning or is in conflict with the original meaning. Justice Scalia, in Heller does not practice 
what he preaches (especially in other decisions101), instead “mak[ing]a great show of being committed 
to the  Constitution’s original meaning, but fail[ing] to carry through on that commitment..”102 He 
throws neutrality and judicial restraint to the wind by “tak[ing] sides in the culture war” surrounding 
gun control through a perverse and unfounded reading  of the Second Amendment that operates under 
the guise of “original meaning” yet serves to propagate only his own “original meaning” and panders 
to the public opinion of that time. 
Since addressing the views of the Framers (who wrote the constitutional text that was voted on 
and eventually ratified by the “People” – the same homogeneous group of white, land-owning males 
Justice Scalia claims apprise “original meaning”) would involve addressing the debates surrounding the 
Constitution103, signaling that “original meaning” may have been contested at the “original” time, Scalia 
instead cites the people that provided the structural and ideological basis for the U.S. Bill of Rights: the 
English Bill of Rights104. Interpreting the English Bill of Rights while ignoring the fundamental 
99 Cornell, “Originalism on Trial” at pg. 630 
100 Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at The Catholic University of America Washington, D.C.: A Theory of Constitution 
Interpretation (Oct. 18, 1996). 
101 Lawrence v. Texas, 530 U.S. 558, 602-603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). “the Court has taken sides in the culture war, 
departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer… [w]hat Texas has chosen to do is well within the range of 
traditional democratic action, and its hand should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new ‘constitutional 
right’ by a Court that is impatient of democratic change.” 
102 Lund, “Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence" at pg1345 
103 Posner, “Looseness” at pg. 3: Judge Posner asserts that, without an acknowledgement of the Framers, Originalism is 
absent in a decision: “Originalism without the interpretive theory that the Framers and the ratifiers of the Constitution 
expected the courts to use in construing constitutional provisions is faux originalism” 
104 Heller, slip op., at Majority 7. 
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differences between the U.S. (federalist, popular sovereignty, classically republican citizenship) and 
England (monarchy, parliament, unitary governance without federalism, liberal right for subjects)105 is 
sheer ignorance. Simply because a document was based on a preexisting document does not mean that 
the documents are identical in meaning; a movie based on true events does not mean the movie is a 
documentary. As Professor Akhil Amar sarcastically notes in response to the proclamation that the 
Second Amendment is identical to the English right, “Or perhaps the Second Amendment aimed to add 
republican and federalist elements to the liberal English right without subtracting one iota from the 
libertarian self-defense core of English law,”106 conveying the ludicrousness of the deduction that any 
substantial conclusions about the actual meaning of the Second Amendment could possibly be drawn 
from analyzing the English Bill of Rights. Justice Stevens elucidates the purpose of the English Bill of 
Rights: to arm a suspect of the people “as a body” to combat possible “oppression by rulers who disarmed 
their political opponents” and to codify the sovereignty of the Parliament107, clearly different from a 
private defense right. Since Scalia utilizes the English common law right to justify his claim that the 
Second Amendment recognizes “the pre-existence of this right” to individual self-defense108, this 
surmise may be discarded; ergo, there seems to be no “pre-existing” self-defense right other than the 
one conceived of within Scalia’s misguided employment of history and textual analysis. 
Part II C: Precedent, Interrupted 
 One of the most brazen conclusions Justice Scalia proliferates in his opinion occurs when, upon 
completion of his historical and textual analysis of the Second Amendment, proceeds to an examination 
of precedent wherein his first sentence reads: “We now ask whether any of our precedents forecloses 
the conclusions we have reached about the meaning of the Second Amendment.”109 This directly 
assumes that he has not only proven that an individual right to gun ownership exists outside the context 
105 Amar, “Heller, HLR” at pg170-171 
106 Amar, “Heller, HLR” at pg171 
107 Heller, slip op., at Stevens Dissent 29: “The English Bill of Rights responded to abuses by the Stuart monarchs; among 
the grievances set forth in the Bill of Rights was that the King had violated the law “[b]y causing several good Subjects 
being Protestants to be disarmed at the same time when Papists were both armed and Employed contrary to Law.” Article 
VII of the Bill of Rights was a response to that selective disarmament; it guaranteed that “the Subjects which are Protestants 
may have Armes for their defence, Suitable to their condition and as allowed by Law.” 
108 Heller, slip op., at Majority 22 
109 Heller, slip op., at Majority 47 
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of militia service but also that the logical reasoning employed to arrive at his conclusion is infallible. In 
his analysis, he addresses problems arising from United States v. Cruikshank,110 Presser v. Illinois111, 
and concludes with a shallow but more thorough (in comparison with Cruikshank and Presser) inquiry 
of the opinion most controlling in this case, United States v. Miller112.  
Scalia’s hubris with regard to his “originalist interpretation” of the Second Amendment blinded 
him from considering any of the aforementioned precedents with a modicum of esteem because he had 
already closed the debate definitively. This lack of consideration is in conflict with the Vesting Clause of 
Article III of the Constitution, normally interpreted as incorporating “a principle of stare 
decisis;”113additionally, the Vesting Clause is crucial if Supreme Court decisions are to have any 
substance in the long term. Ergo, any true originalist, provided the precedent does not conflict with the 
Constitution, would strictly adhere to the Vesting Clause114 or risk being in violation of the Constitution. 
Problematic, though, is that the useful case law on the Second Amendment is “missing in action.”115 
Lacking precedent does not indicate that an issue has not been thoroughly discussed but, rather “a 
widely shared perspective” that the current functioning of a clause or provision is proficient with regard 
to its purpose.116 But, Justice Scalia audaciously alters the meaning of the Second Amendment while 
maintaining that this new definition would leave the controlling precedent intact, permitting him to 
snub past case law and chronological progression of meaning with another form of backwards 
induction.117 
Originalism functions best, with “best” referring to “allowing for subjective interpretation of 
110 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
111 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
112 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
113 Lund, “Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence" at pg1347 
114 United States Constitution, Article III, Section I: “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the 
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” 
115 Van Alstyne “Personal Right" at pg1239 
116 Mack and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) at 978, Justice Breyer dissenting. Justice Breyer maintains that 
lacking precedent, with regard to “direct federal assignment of duties to state officials,” indicates “a widely shared practice 
of assigning such duties in other ways.” With regard to the Second Amendment, the rarity of Second Amendment litigation 
implies that legislation on the Amendment operates in ways that are not restrictive enough to be seriously contested – 
except when in the hands of gun-rights advocate such as Respondent Dick Heller of Heller.  
117 Heller, slip op., at Majority 52, footnote 24: “In any event, it should not be thought that the cases decided by these 
judges would necessarily have come out differently under a proper interpretation of the right.” Conversely, an 
independent right to own guns would change the decision in each controlling precedents. 
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contentious clauses,” when it is uncontrolled by prior decisions and “doctrine is not developed” on the 
issue, “but the Court has rarely spoken in originalist terms even when doctrine barely exists.”118 
However, a lack of precedent may be representative. One reason for regarding Heller as a particularly 
important test of originalism is that there were virtually no relevant Supreme Court precedents, and 
certainly none that could be considered dispositive. The Court, facing few precedents (the most recent 
of which was decided in 1939), had room to operate, facing few obstacles to creating this new, 
substantive right within the Second Amendment; where controlling precedent led to a conclusion with 
which the Court “simply [did] not approve,”119 the Court would disregard the decision because it 
reached a different (and thus controlling) conclusion than the one articulated in Heller, undermining 
the judicial activism of the decision. Thus from the ashes of Heller arose a new right and a new type of 
ruling: Heller was “the first time in U.S. history that the Supreme Court has invoked the amendment to 
invalidate a statute or, as in this case, a city ordinance that is directly subject to the restraints of the Bill 
of Rights: the functional equivalent of a federal statute.120 From 1791 to 2008, the Court never showed 
any inclination that it believed the Second Amendment to control the right to anything but military use 
of weapons as determined by the state. Why did the essential meaning of the Second Amendment 
suddenly change in 2008 after remaining virtually unchallenged for such a long time?121 
 William Merkel avers that, while originalism typically fails to procure a precise reading of 
Constitutional text when no dominant understanding appeared at the time of the text’s creation, in the 
“rare case” of unambiguous text, originalism can be “honestly and faithfully applied” to arrive at an 
unambiguous answer . 122 In the “rare case” of the Second Amendment, the unambiguous answer is the 
118 Sunstein, “Griswold” at pg. 250 
119 Heller, slip op., at Stevens Dissent 45 
120 Levinson, “Assessing Heller” at pg. 317 
121 The answer to this question is, simply, that the Court of popular debate, bolstered by aggressive National Rifle 
Association propaganda, began to believe in a fundamental right to gun ownership for private purposes. Cass Sunstein 
remarks, in Sunstein, “Griswold” at pg. 253, that “Any ruling against an individual right to have guns for purposes of self-
defense and hunting would have been wildly unpopular. Such a ruling would have polarized the nation. By contrast, 
Heller itself was met with widespread social approval.” 
122 Merkel, “Scalia Perverse” at pg. 356 (remarking that “in such cases, originalism cannot elevate constitutional judging 
above the contentious plane of politics because the meaning of the constitutional text was hotly, bitterly, and ideologically 
contested at the time it was created.”) The extensive duration throughout which the Second Amendment’s meaning was 
uncontested almost demands that the “public understanding” was understood – as in, the guaranteed protection was to the 
state militia from central government interference. Since the Second Amendment was never understood to protect other 
rights, be them hunting or self-defense, for over 200 years, the Court’s determination that it magically did protect other 
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right of a state to a militia without federal government interference.” Of the three relevant precedents, 
all support that definition of the Second Amendment Right. Cruikshank framed the Second Amendment 
as federalist in quality, declaring that the Second Amendment is a restriction on the powers of the central 
government, as deferential to the state, positing that violation of a citizen’s rights is to be redressed by 
“powers which relate to municipal legislation” or police powers of a state or locality, and as not 
concerning “bearing arms for a lawful purpose” as “that right is not guaranteed by the Constitution.”123 
Presser arrives at its conclusion, protecting the “exercise of this power [of militia] by the states is 
necessary to the public peace, safety, and good order,”124 by relying heavily on Cruikshank, a pristine 
example of adhering to the principle of stare decisis. While reviewing Cruikshank and, subsequently, 
Presser in Heller, the Court seems to forget stare decisis by blatantly misinterpreting the normal reading 
of Cruikshank (see note 121) while challenging Presser not on its evocation of Cruikshank’s normal 
meaning to arrive at its decision but, alternatively, as saying “nothing about the Second Amendment’s 
meaning or scope.”125 Thus, Presser and Cruikshank’s concurrence in a meaning and scope of the 
Second Amendment “say nothing about the Second Amendment’s meaning or scope,” a nonsensical 
conclusion further bolstering the absurdity and fallacy underlying the majority opinion.126 
 United States v. Miller127 should have been the controlling precedent for Heller had the Court 
obliged stare decisis; it held that the National Firearms Act of 1934 was constitutional exercise of 
rights was not a result rooted in history but, rather popular opinion. 
123 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 553. “The right there specified is that of ‘bearing arms for a lawful purpose.’ This is not a right 
granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second 
amendment declares that it shall not be infringed, but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be 
infringed by Congress.” Somehow, the Majority in Heller (Heller, slip op., at Majority 47) misinterprets this sentence to 
arrive at the conclusion that Cruikshank “described the right protected by the Second Amendment as ‘bearing arms for a 
lawful purpose.’” As recognized by Stevens in his dissent, this conclusion is wholly inaccurate. (Heller, slip op., at Stevens 
Dissent 39.) The “normal reading” of this statement explicitly denies constitutional protection under the Second 
Amendment to “bearing arms for a lawful purpose,” implying that constitutional protection may be had for that specific 
right under a future amendment. 
124 Presser, 116 U.S. 268: “All citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the…reserved militia of the United States as well 
as of the states…the states cannot…prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms so as to deprive the United States of 
their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing their duty to the 
general government.” 
125 Heller slip at 49; Justice Stevens, in Dissent, stated that Presser proliferated the notion that the constitutionally protected 
right was that of arms in the context of militia; rights outside the militia context were protected (post at 40). 
126 And, both opinions directly conflict with the majority in McDonald by explicitly stating that the Second Amendment is 
a right of the states against the government, hence why it was not incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to 
the states (until the decision in McDonald) while almost all of the other provisions of the bill of rights were. 
127 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) 
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government power and not a violation of the Second Amendment or of the states’ militia right.128 
Furthermore, it classified the type of weapon used to have no “reasonable relationship to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia” to render it unprotected under the Second 
Amendment penumbras, mostly due to the fact that the weapon was not “part of the ordinary military 
equipment” and use of the weapon would likely not “contribute to the common defense.”129 Miller, like 
Heller, discussed the Blackstone Commentaries, the English militia system, the state militia system, and 
legislature enacted by the states in the before and during the Constitutional era, in order to arrive at a 
definition for “militia” as it was employed in the Second Amendment – as a military entity. The Heller 
Court immediately dismissed the findings of Miller except that the Second Amendment may not apply 
to certain types of weapons.130  
Ironically, the Court criticized Miller for arriving at its opinion through a consideration of the 
English Right to Bear Arms, a piece of evidence employed earlier in the Heller decision to support its 
finding of an individual arms right.131 Despite Miller blatantly connecting the Second Amendment to 
militia use and limiting “Arms” to those used by a militia, the Court in Heller discarded most of the 
decision, reading it “to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically 
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords 
with the historical understanding of the scope of the right…”132 By not entirely discarding Miller, the 
Court pretends that, yes, it did adhere to stare decisis. And, in McDonald, the Court most certainly held 
to the stare decisis of Heller by overturning Cruikshank and Presser (this time overtly). But, common 
sense dictates that the Court’s decision was not informed by “straight path of stare decisis.”133 
128 Miller, 307 U.S. 174, at 174, the Court explains that a “12-gague shotgun with a barrel less than 18 inches long,” as a 
result of the weapon’s passage through state lines (interstate commerce), the lack of registration, and the non-military or 
militia use of that weapon did not merit protection under the Second Amendment and violated the National Firearms Act. 
The decision implies that Congress can regulate this particular usage of guns as a result of the interstate travel of the gun 
despite the fact that the right to keep and bear arms varied from state to state – indicating federal government supremacy 
while maintaining room for experimentation with Arms legislation within the states as is provided in a federalist system of 
divided powers.  
129 Miller, 307 U.S. 174, at 178. 
130 Heller, slip op., at Majority at 50 
131 Heller, slip op., at Majority at 51 
132 Heller, slip op., at Majority 53 
133 Heller, slip op., at Stevens Dissent 4. Justice Stevens articulates, “While stare decisis is not an inexorable command, the 
careful observer will discern that any detours from the straight path of stare decisis in our past have occurred for 
articulable reasons, and only when the Court has felt obliged ‘to bring its opinions into agreement with experience and 
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Part III A: Popular Constitutionalism & Pandering 
In Heller, the Court determines that Miller indicated that “the traditional militia was formed 
from a pool of men bringing arms ‘in common use at the time’ for lawful purposes like self-defense.”134 
But, as Professor Reva Siegel notices, “It is, to say the least, striking than an originalist interpretation of 
the Second Amendment would treat civic republican understandings of the amendment as antiquated, 
and refuse to protect the arms a militia needs to defend against tyranny.”135 Ergo, in maintaining that 
Miller has a semblance of relevance (prohibiting non-military weapons), the Court simultaneously 
stripped it of that same relevance (by changing “non-military” weapons to an allowance for arms “in 
common use of at the time”). The net of this alteration of Miller’s meaning is not the prohibition of non-
military weapons but the allowance of “common” weaponry, like handguns, decidedly non-military in 
almost all uses. If the Court allows weaponry to refer to those arms common at the time, and most 
persons in the United States are not in the military and, by proxy, do not have access to military weapons 
(legally, at least), then the definition of weaponry regards almost solely non-military weapons and 
fluctuates over time, technology, and accessibility. Originalists maintain that the Constitution is a static 
document, uninfluenced by the ebb and flow of public opinion; concurrently, in a supposedly 
“originalist” decision, Justice Scalia finds the static “original meaning” of the Second Amendment 
through evidence rife with temporal oddities and finds the definition of the range of weapons to be 
protected by that Amendment to be subjectively based on the desires and tendencies of the public. 
Pandering to public sympathies does not comport with “original meaning;” Justice Scalia’s decision, at 
with facts newly ascertained.” Most certainly, the Heller majority did not adhere to stare decisis nor did they abide by the 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) test for overturning precedent nor to the 
ideal set by Chief Justice John Roberts’s concurring opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010) “[Stare decisis’s] greatest purpose is to serve a constitutional ideal—the rule of law. It follows that in the 
unusual circumstance when fidelity to any particular precedent does more to damage this constitutional ideal than to 
advance it, we must be more willing to depart from that precedent.” Heller does not comport with this “unusual 
circumstance” given the uncontested nature of the constitutional ideal for centuries that solidifies its “original meaning.” 
134 Heller, slip op., at Majority 52; ironically, “traditionally” is a phrase indicates a progression and alteration over time of 
a practice anchored in the cultural history of a people. This, with regard to the “traditional” use of militia, would never be 
construed to be a “citizen’s militia” because, traditionally, people that were eligible to be in the militia and wanted to join 
the militia were in the militia as constructed by the state. Just as “militiamen” did not traditionally act as vigilantes, staying 
within the confines of the state’s orders, the ideal of vigilantism as embodied by the “citizen’s militias” is not in accord with 
the traditional meaning of “militia.” The Constitution traditionally reserved police power to the states; it did not 
traditionally allow unrestricted use of weaponry for the lofty and undefinable concept of “self-defense.” 
135 Siegel, “Dead or Alive” at pg193 
Page | 26 
 
                                                     
 
 
the very least, diverges from originalism and “original meaning.” He interprets the Constitution based 
on populist opinion, injecting the Supreme Court into the realm of “Culture War” he so abhors.136 
In “Federalist 49,” James Madison warns against the succumbing to public opinion in any of the 
three branches of government because it poses a threat to “public tranquillity[sic];” deducing that public 
“passion” should not “sit in judgment” instead of public “reason,” Madison asserts that the 
Government’s responsibility is to control the deleterious effects of public “passion” through government 
regulation.137 With gun violence, something usually the result of “passion” (hence the phrase “crime 
of passion”), becoming an epidemic, the need for national gun regulation is palpable but possibilities 
for it are unduly hindered by Heller and McDonald. Three of the District of Columbia’s handgun 
ordinances, in Heller, were struck down because “few laws in the history of our Nation have come close 
to the severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban,”138 insinuating that its ordinance was an outlier, 
not in comport with the national consensus of “acceptable” gun –control laws, and ergo likely to be 
supported by less-than-reasonable tenets.139  
Professor Cass Sunstein opines that “both historians and political scientists have shown that the 
connections between judicial rulings and public convictions are far more pervasive than is usually 
thought.”140 That line of reasoning seams to provide context for the Heller decision answers the question 
of why 207 years elapsed between the ratification of the Second Amendment and the Supreme Court 
codifying a personal property right in firearms: because, for about 150 of those years, the “people” did 
not believe that they had an individual right to gun ownership under the Second Amendment141. Reva 
136 See supra note 100. Perhaps he participates in this “culture war” because he’s been involved in it since before he 
ascended to the Supreme Court. According to Robert Barnes article “Gun case presents quandary for Supreme Court 
justices,” published March 1, 2010 in the Washington Post (Section A01), Scalia “is unquestionably the court's most 
outspoken proponent of gun rights. He has lamented in speeches that gun ownership is too often linked with criminal 
behavior and his hunting trip with then-Vice President Cheney caused a national controversy.” That would explain, too, 
why he insists so adamantly in changing the constitutionally-accepted definition of the Second Amendment – so he can 
continue to hunt turkeys without fear of disarmament by Draconian, tyrannical gun-control laws. 
137 “Federalist 49,” James Madison (308/310) 
138 Heller, slip op., at Majority 57 
139 Sunstein, “Griswold” at pg263 
140 Sunstein, “Griswold” at pg. 262 
141 William Van Alstyne romantically recounted his life-altering encounter with the NRA’s reading of the Second 
Amendment in his pivotal article “The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms,” Duke Law Journal , Volume 
43, 1993-1994 at page1241: “That "something more," I think, requires one to consider what one might be more willing to 
think about in the following way-that perhaps the NRA is not wrong, after all, in its general Second Amendment stance-a 
stance we turn here briefly to review.” 
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Siegel recounts that the “New Right” gun lobby, spearheaded by the NRA, changed the cultural 
consensus surrounding the Second Amendment in response to threats of gun-control legislation – this 
change in constitutional culture resulted in a change in constitutional law, embodying the process that 
Siegel terms “Popular Constitutionalism.”142,143 Scalia, it appears, made himself a figure in the gun-
rights social movement through his penning of Heller, and the loud voice of the gun-rights lobby 
supported his decision so loudly that the non-legal public neglected to see the flaws in his argument.144 
Like the Civil Rights Movement achieving its first major victory legal in Brown v. Board of Education145 
after a long, labored attempt to change the cultural discourse surrounding segregationist policies, the 
Gun Right Movement achieved its first major legal victory in Heller; furthermore, with Justice Scalia as 
its speaker-box, the New Right movement had its views normalized and trumpeted through a Justice 
able to speak to “his colleagues and his political friends simultaneously.”146  
It cannot be asserted that Heller was rooted in constitutional text or law since the New Right 
gun-rights movement preceded the case by at least 30 years to effectively alter the public discourse. As 
Professor Akhil Amar muses, if a change in public discourse is so great as to convince enough people 
that a right exists and that this right is fundamental, then the right becomes “a right of the people” 
regardless of how erroneous the roots for the specific belief are.147 If Heller is “living constitutionalism 
142 Siegel, “Dead or Alive” at pg192: Describing popular constitutionalism and its ramifications: “On the popular 
constitutionalism view, the Court itself is deciding whether handgun bans are consistent with the best understanding of 
our constitutional tradition; the determination is made in the present and responds to the beliefs and values of living 
Americans who identify with the commitments and traditions of their forbear… the Court is normatively engaged in 
matters about which living Americans passionately dis- agree, enforcing its own convictions about the best understanding 
of a living constitutional tradition to which Heller contributes. On this account, Heller, through its originalism, participates 
in what Justice Scalia refers to in his Lawrence dissent as ‘the culture war.’”   
143 Siegel, “Dead or Alive;” Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term - Comment: Dead or Alive: Originalism As 
Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 Harvard Law Review. 191 (2008) 
144 Lori Guinier, “Demosprudence through Dissent,” published in Harvard Law Review, Vol 122, No 1. (Nov 2008) at page 
94. (Hereafter Guinier, “Demosprudence”) 
145 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
146 Guinier, “Demosprudence” at pg114, continuing, “In the process, he camouflages the law/politics distinction and 
creates his own exception to the law/politics divide. Justice Scalia uses his originalism jurisprudence as a language that a 
political movement can both understand and rally around” and aligns himself “with “with a social movement or 
community of accountability that mobilizes to change the meaning of the Constitution over time.” 
147 Amar, “Heller, HLR” at pg162, Amar derisively refers to this kind of process wherein ideological change in the people 
influences Court interpretation as Ninth Amendment supercedents: “Such rights-expanding cases that Americans have 
come to embrace, whether or not these cases originally got the Constitution's text and original understanding correct, 
deserve a name. Let us call them Ninth Amendment superprecedents. And let us honor these cases and the new rights they 
proclaim, rather than denying or disparaging these rights of the people, by the people, for the people, and from the 
people.”  
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for conservatives,”148 then Siegel’s definition of “popular constitutionalism” holds for the majority 
opinion as it gives the people of the present the ability to choose their rights based on the interpretation 
of text from the past – more backwards induction. 
Part III B: Scrutiny & Dicta 
 A seemingly inconsequential case, United States v. Carolene Products Company149, provides the 
answer to a question (likely deliberately) left unanswered by the Court in Heller: if guns are a 
fundamental right, what level of judicial scrutiny are they afforded? Justice Scalia, footnoting Carolene 
Products,  remarks “Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated 
constitutional rights, banning from the home “the most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and 
use for protection of one’s home and family, ‘would fail constitutional muster.’”150 He maintains that 
“rational basis scrutiny” would not apply to the District of Columbia’s handgun law because of the 
higher scrutiny afforded to enumerated rights; however, that level of scrutiny is never articulated. 
Provided that firearms are a fundamental, individual right, and support for gun-ownership is 
widespread, it is unlikely that law passing through a legislature could muster up enough support to 
successfully pass and implement a “Draconian” gun law. This cultural fact renders Justice Scalia’s 
omission of a scrutiny level moot: a proposed law substantially infringing fundamental gun rights will 
not be perceived by many, if any, legislatures to be rationally related to a policy goal, and, resultantly, 
fail to become law.  
Employing the scrutiny standards established in Carolene to protect fundamental rights, Sunstein 
remarks, “There is no special reason for an aggressive judicial role in protecting against gun control, in 
light of the fact that opponents of such control have considerable political power and do not seem to be 
at a systematic disadvantage in the democratic process.”151 This comment not only reinforces the 
conception of a powerful national gun lobby, capable of changing the constitution, but also to the 
failures of a democratic system where gun rights are supported by a minority of the people affected 
148 Lund, “Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence" at pg1345 
149 United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), concerning Footnote 4 
150 Heller, slip op., at Majority 56, 57 
151 Sunstein, “Griswold” at pg260 
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directly by gun violence152. Because statistical studies have been rejected by the Court as acceptable 
evidence in holding a claim of racial bias in a law,153 it is unlikely that a statistical study showing a 
discrepancy in the race of crime victims versus the race of crime owners would trigger strict scrutiny 
and force the Courts to balance the protection of gun rights with that of a protected class. Still, the only 
references the Court makes, in both Heller and McDonald, concerning intersection of race and gun-
control is in the context of black disarmament (as a result of irrational, racist fears at the time of 
ratification) and of the Civil War. When a law attempting to reduce violence through restrictive gun 
laws in a majority-minority city, like the District, is struck down by a panel of Justices, all of whom 
received the benefit of an Ivy-League education and one of whom is black, without considering the 
population of the community governed by the law (though many references were made to the “political 
community,”) the analysis will always be lacking.154 
 While the lack of scrutiny155 level befuddles the breadth of Heller’s newfound right, the dicta in 
part IV of the majority opinion questions the sanity of those joining in the opinion.156 The dicta, 
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures,”157 limit the scope of the fundamental right found and 
codified by the preceding sections of the majority opinion, conferring the type of plausible gun control 
laws that would not conflict with new reading of the Second Amendment: felon restrictions, mentally-
152 Maxine Burkett, “Much Ado About…Something Else: D.C. v. Heller, the Racialized Mythology of the Second 
Amendment, and Gun Policy Reform” Legal Studies Research Paper Series (March 20, 2008) at page 37; On the upcoming 
Heller decision and the ability of the Court to protect minorities by deferring the individual decision of the legislature of 
the District of Columbia, “The extent to which courts are willing to do so is likely to be one of the true legacies of Heller, 
which will confront a white plaintiff’s challenge to gun control laws enacted to stem the violence in a majority-black city 
where victims are black in nearly 100% of gun homicides.” 
153 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), where the Court rejected “The Baldus Study,” a statistical analysis showing a 
statistically significant correlation between race of victim and race of offender on the likelihood that the offender will 
receive the death penalty. 
154 This, of course, is a problem with strict adherence to an Originalist doctrine: no consideration of the present societal 
conditions. 
155 In Carlton F.W. Larson, “Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit” 
published in Hastings Law Journal, Vol 60. (2009) at page 1373, Larson argues that, through a backwards induction-
inspired dissection of the dicta exceptions in the Heller opinion, one can “identify the standard of scrutiny actually 
employed…the standard of scrutiny simply cannot be strict scrutiny, as many of the exceptions are inexplicable under 
strict scrutiny.” (Hereafter, Larson, “Ipse Dixit”) 
156 Levinson, “Assessing Heller” at pg. 322-323, Levinson alludes to a conspiracy theory proffered by other legal scholars, 
surmising that Justice Scalia would not have labored so intensely to found a new constitutional right only to have the dicta 
in his own opinion restrict that right greatly: “Although there is no direct evidence, one suspects that the most likely 
explanation has to do with the internal bargaining of the five justices in the majority. It certainly would not be surprising if 
Justice Anthony Kennedy threatened to withhold his vote from Scalia’s opinion if it did not, gratuitously or not, take pains 
to indicate its minimal scope.” 
157 Heller, slip op., at Majority 26 
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ill restrictions, sensitive space prohibitions, economic regulation-centric restrictions or requirements, 
and certain types of non-“bearable” weapons. The exceptions are not particularly well founded in 
historical interpretation and occasion unjustifiable precepts to govern the classes of people, places, and 
things (being weaponry) subject to gun-control legislation; for example, Martha Stewart, domestic 
Goddess, creator of her own line of towels, and convicted inside trader, is a felon and cannot, within 
Heller’s exceptions to the Second Amendment Right made in dicta, legally “keep and bear arms.” 
Professor Carlton Larson argues that the “Court’s claim about the need to ‘expound upon the historical 
justifications for the exceptions’ in a later case seems inconsistent with a stark 
interpretation/construction dichotomy.”158 Surely, it follows, an Originalist such as Scalia would not 
appreciate the future direction of his opinion be rerouted according to state and local legislatures or, 
even worse, another Supreme Court decision. Thus, the exceptions, though limiting the scope of the 
right found in the Amendment, must have been a “peril of compromise” informed by a strain of “policy 
analysis and balancing”159 thoroughly decried earlier in the opinion by Scalia. The most limiting of the 
exceptions, that the Second Amendment provides for self-defense in the context of a home 
environment160, without specifying other possible locations for “self-defense,” thoroughly limits 
widespread applicability of the statute. However, the mere allowance for handguns within the home, as 
Justice Breyer notes in his dissent, “If a resident has a handgun in the home that he can use for self-
defense, then he has a handgun in the home that he can use to commit suicide or engage in acts of 
domestic violence.”161 Since handguns are used in a majority of murders162, it seems logical to assume 
that some of those murders occur within the home; therefore, the portability of handguns intensifies 
158 Larson, “Ipse Dixit” at pg1373 
159 Mark Tushnet, “Heller and the Perils of Compromise,” published in 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 419 2009 cited at page 
427 (Hereafter, Tushnet, “Compromise”) Tushnet, when explaining the logic behind the “popularity of weapon” dicta, 
questions how such a formula arose, arrives at a plausible conclusion: “The answer must be based in some sort of policy 
analysis and balancing, perhaps that contemporary handguns are "enough like" muskets and pistols with respect to their 
ability to protect against assaults in the home and to their susceptibility to dangerous misuse, where the metrics of ability-
to-protect and misuse take contemporary circumstances into account.” 
160 Heller, slip op., at Majority 53; that the Second Amendment surely protects an individual’s right to bear handguns to 
protect their “hearth and home.” 
161 Heller, slip op., at Breyer Dissent 33 
162 Professor Carl Bogus, “Gun Control and America’s Cities: Public Policy and Politics”, Albany Government Law Review 
(Vol I, 2008) at page 447, remarking that over 60% of murders are committed with a handgun even though handguns 
account for about a third of all guns owned in the United States. (Hereafter, Bogus, “Gun Control”) 
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their ability to harm others and be misused (in other words, used for reasons other than self-defense of 
hearth and home).  
Part III C: Heller and the Perils of Compromise 
As of now, the Second Amendment with Scalia’s interpretive lens and activist dicta reads: “The 
‘not unlimited’163 right of all people with a ‘lawful purpose’164 to keep and to bear firearms considered 
popular (based on the ownership statistics of the gun-owning populace), unless such firearms be 
popular but of a ‘dangerous and unusual’ character,165 should not be infringed because this ‘not 
unlimited right,’ although unnecessary to a well regulated Militia (National Guard), is a necessary 
option for the “Citizen’s Militia,” of which all people are members (provided these people are physically 
able, not mentally ill, not a felon, not subject to the “conditions and qualifications on the commercial 
sale of arms,”166 and not planning to enter a “sensitive place”167), because of an improbable but possible 
relationship to the security of free state, defined as either a state championing republican liberties or a 
physically-bounded commonwealth, in the event that the National Guard is incapacitated during an 
occasion of insurrection.” Whatever judicial principle guided the Heller majority and arrived at this 
definition is woefully flawed.  
 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer foretold of the ambiguity of Heller encouraging “legal 
challenges to gun regulation throughout the Nation,” 168 imposing an unnecessary burden on the 
163 Heller, slip op., at Majority 54 “Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From 
Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to 
keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” 
164 From Note 122, the Court conceives the phrase “lawful purpose” to be compulsory for the proper bearing of arms, 
deriving this definition from Cruikshank, a case wherein the Court cleared convictions for some of the white men that 
participated in the Colfax Massacre. Despite the death of hundreds of black people as a result of the Massacre, the Heller 
Court decides that this constituted a lawful use of guns under the Second Amendment. Furthermore, the pliable meaning of 
“lawful purpose” could provide for a myriad of situations to receive Constitutional protection. Therefore, vigilantism is 
tacitly encouraged by the Heller majority, encouraging the people to protect themselves instead of entrusting themselves to 
the police power of the state for protection.  
165 Heller, slip op., at Majority 55, explaining that military weapons may be banned because they are not “in common use” 
by the public. Justice Breyer, dissenting at slip 42, remarks “On the majority’s reasoning, if tomorrow someone invents a 
particularly useful, highly dangerous self-defense weapon, Congress and the States had better ban it immediately, for once 
it becomes popular Congress will no longer possess the constitutional authority to do so.” This is the perfect illustration of 
the ludicrousness of the majority’s proposition. Moreover, if you can show me a gun “in common use” (otherwise known 
as a handgun) that is not dangerous, then that gun is certainly unusual and possibly defective. 
166 Heller, slip op., at Majority 54. This obliquely permits the federal government to pass legislation restricting guns 
through their powers granted by the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 
167 Heller, slip op., at Majority 54, defining “sensitive place” as “schools or government buildings. 
168 Heller, slip op., at Breyer Dissent 40 
Page | 32 
 
                                                     
 
 
legislative branch. As he predicted, gun-rights groups flocked together to capitalize on the Court’s 
opportunistic opinion hoping to capitalize on its majority-Conservative membership. By opening the 
flood-gates to accommodate myriad of gun-control challenge suits, Heller’s ambiguity seems more 
purposeful in retrospect: if Justice Scalia is a gun-rights supporter, then leaving Heller ambiguous would 
guarantee swift legislative action to expand the Heller Second Amendment right while Scalia and 
company were still on the Court. Unsurprisingly, the NRA led the pack in lawsuits: “The day that Heller 
was decided, suit was filed against the City of Chicago challenging its ban on handgun registration and 
its re-registration requirement for other firearms. The next day, the National Rifle Association filed five 
lawsuits challenging handgun prohibitions in Chicago, in the suburbs of Chicago, and in public housing 
in San Francisco.”169 One of the NRA’s lawsuits, NRA v. Chicago,170 was consolidated with another case 
to form McDonald, the ugly offspring of off-brand originalism, public constitutionalism, incorrect 
textual interpretation, states’ rights supremacy, selective adherence to stare decisis, and, worst of all, 
Heller.  
The amalgamation of all of Heller’s missteps with the added bonus of expanding Heller’s 
misguided suppositions to apply to all state and local government through the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause. Subsequently, the fundamental right to individual gun ownership in Heller – 
including its holding averring the “central component” imparting Second Amendment Rights to be 
“individual self-defense” – was deemed “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty,”171 entrenching 
the “gun right” as a substantive due process right. With McDonald striking down two of the City of 
Chicago’s gun-control ordinances, considered an “outlier” akin to the three “Draconian” provisions of 
DC’s ordinance struck down in Heller, the Court is tacitly degrading the federalist concept of 
experimentation and deference to local authority.172 For those counting, the Court disregarded three 
169 Wilkinson, “Of Guns, Abortion” at pg. 282 
170 567 F3d 856 (7th Cir 2009) 
171 McDonald, slip op. Majority at 19 
172 Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, “Five Takes on McDonald v. Chicago,” published in Journal of Law & 
Politics, Volume XXVI: 273, April 2011 (Hereafter Denning, Reynolds, “Five Takes”), cited at page 13.“Like Heller, 
McDonald produced a result that aligned with the expectations of many Americans. The decision is another data point in 
favor of the theory that the Court is a lagging, rather than a leading indicator of popular preference, often 
constitutionalizing a national consensus and enforcing that consensus against outliers.” See also at note 129. 
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precedents grounded in federalism, two local laws governed in federalism, and the federalist meaning 
formulating the principle ratiocination for the drafting of the Second Amendment. Rejecting federalist 
principles in this manner results in the disenfranchisement of the people; the Court’s decision deems 
the people unfit to elect adept legislators that enact constitutionally valid laws, thereby removing any 
semblance of local government authority through nullification of the government’s legislative decisions 
without inquiry into the legislation’s net effect on the “general welfare” of their citizenry.173 
Fortunately, only one Justice, Justice Thomas, accorded with the McDonald Petitioner’s assertion 
that the Second Amendment was to be incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment’s “Privileges or 
Immunities Clause” of Citizens; had more Justices sided with Thomas and found that the “gun right” 
was a privilege of citizenship, overturning the Slaughter-House Cases,174 then the right would win strict 
scrutiny level review175, be in conflict with the Heller dicta exclusions for the “not unlimited” gun-
right, and preclude a large share (if not all) preexisting gun-control legislation. Although the “gun-
right” should not be considered a fundamental right, taking Heller’s conclusions as correct, it would 
seem that the Heller majority’s derivation of the “self-defense right” from reading “militia” to 
encompass both formal and informal (re: “Citizen’s militia”) definitions would compel any future 
incorporation of the Second Amendment right to be performed under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Clause regarding citizens rather than due process (encompassing all persons). Certainly, the Framers 
and “the people” at the time of Fourteenth Amendment (and Second Amendment) ratification would 
not have liked their constitution to provide a right to weaponry for parties within the United States but 
not citizens, especially because of the intense xenophobia of that time (re: “No Irish Need Apply;” Know-
173 McDonald majority, Alito at 43 “Second, petitioners and many others who live in high-crime areas dispute the 
proposition that the Second Amendment right does not protect minorities and those lacking political clout.” Justice Alito is 
misguided here: the problem is not the Second Amendment; the problem is that the Court conducts a de facto removal of 
their right by invalidating the decisions of their legislature. If the Court resided in a “high-crime area,” they would likely 
support actions to limit the proliferation of gun violence – something not achieved by striking down gun-control laws. In 
2012, two years after McDonald, the murder rate in Chicago has increased by 38%. See “Chicago's murder rate up 38%  
in 2012” by Edward Fadden at http://www.examiner.com/article/chicago-s-murder-rate-up-38-2012 
174 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873), employed an extremely limited interpretation of the “Privileges or 
Immunities” Clause of the 14th Amendment that essentially rendered it ineffectual and inconsequential. Thomas’s 
concurrence in McDonald approbates overturning the Slaughter-House Cases to restore the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and to “protect with greater clarity and predictability than the substantive due process 
framework” the fundamental rights of the people of the United States (McDonald 561 U.S. ____ at Thomas slip pg. 8).  
175 This is just a postulation based on footnote 4 of Carolene Products, Co. (see note 151). 
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Nothing Party). Since many suppose that incorporating rights under the “Privileges or Immunities” 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would necessitate incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights to apply 
to the states, and the selective incorporation doctrine declined to incorporate all the amendments of the 
Bill of Rights, it could also be proffered that, if the Second Amendment were meant to apply to the states, 
it would have been done so sooner than 2010. 
During oral arguments for McDonald, Justice Scalia seemed almost pained about the ideological 
tear he was about to undergo by siding with a decision wherein a new substantive right was codified 
and applied to the states, choosing gun-rights over faithfulness to the “original intent” doctrine he 
essentially authored.176 Although Scalia abandons his avowal to stay away from “Culture Wars” and 
refrain from “judicial usurpation” 177  through finding new, substantive fundamental rights in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the entire Court, including the dissenters, opt not to revisit 
the historical premises of Heller in any meaningful scope; therefore, the majority’s flagrant 
contravention of the history record that premises the unfathomable act of judicial activism embodied 
by redefinition of an Amendment at the behest of public pressures is destined to leave an ugly stain on 
Second Amendment stare decisis trajectory for future decisions. In terms of public health, this poses a 
great danger to citizens in jurisdictions with high rates of gun violence where the legislature cannot 
successfully pass or maintain gun-control regulation as a consequence of the precedent set by Heller 
and McDonald. 
The maxim “more guns, less crime” is not sustainable. The proper statement would read “more 
guns, more gun proliferation, more potential for both gun misuse and for gun use, more potential for 
gun accidents, more potential for rapid escalation during “confrontations,” more crime.”178 In the 
176 In oral arguments, Justice Scalia asked Mr. Gura, attorney for Mr. McDonald, if “rights rooted in the traditions and 
conscious of our people” would be a sufficient “guidepost” to clarify the “unenumerated rights which the Framers and the 
Ratifiers didn’t literally understand,” and, upon Mr. Gura replying in the affirmative (“Yes”), Scalia sarcastically remarked 
“That happens to be the test we have used under substantive due process.” Accessible at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1521.pdf 
177 See note 101 on Lawrence v. Texas. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), Justice Scalia dissenting at 85. 
“The entire practice of using the Due Process Clause to add judicially favored rights to the limitations upon democracy set 
forth in the Bill of Rights (usually under the rubric of so-called "substantive due process") is in my view judicial 
usurpation. But we have, recently at least, sought to limit the damage by tethering the courts' "right-making" power to an 
objective criterion.” 
178 These are, roughly, summaries of the statistical evidence in “Gun Control and America’s Cities: Public Policy and 
Politics” by Professor Carl Bogus, Albany Government Law Review (Vol I, 2008). 
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District of Columbia, a comparative analysis revealed that, after the employment of its “draconian,” 
“outlier” gun-control law, gun-related homicides fell by more than 25% while no statistically significant 
change occurred in the surrounding communities in Virginia and Maryland; additionally, gun-related 
suicides fell by 23%.179 The ban welcomed an “abrupt” decline in homicides upon its date of effect.180 
There are a multitude of studies showing a positive correlation between increased strength of gun-
control laws and decreased rate of gun-related injuries and death. To deprive state, local, and federal 
jurisdictions from passing policy that best addresses the gun control needs of its citizenry is to deprive 
of their most valuable right; it is not a coincidence that “right to life” is always ordered before “liberty” 
and “property.” 
Part IV: The 2nd Amendment Jurisprudence Trajectory and How to Change It 
 A “balancing-interest” approach was completely disregarded by the majorities of Heller and 
McDonald as judicial activism. Conversely, one can also find the majority opinions in those cases to be 
judicial activism. This discrepancy in meaning underlies the entire debate surrounding the Second 
Amendment; a rational individual would read the Court’s whole opinion in each case, muse at the level 
of squabbling between majority and minority factions, and wonder about the effect that these decisions 
have had on society in the macrocosm of the United States and the microcosm of an individual 
community. As Chief Justice John Marshall stated in McCullough v. Maryland, “The government 
proceeds directly from the people; is ’ordained and established,’ in the name of the people, and is 
declared to be ordained, ‘in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic 
tranquility, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and to their posterity.’”181 In Third Grade, 
all children in the United States learn that there are three branches of government in their history 
classes. One of those branches is the judicial branch, thus binding all the members of the Court to 
Marshall’s adages in McCullough v. Maryland. The Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald do not 
decide in accordance with any of the above maxims. The Court brazenly adopts the NRA’s interpretation 
179 Bogus, “Gun Control” at page 457 
180 Bogus, “Gun Control” at page 457 
181 McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), Chief Justice John Marshall for the majority. Notice, these phrases are 
from the Preamble to the United States Constitution. 
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of the Second Amendment, despite it being “one of the greatest pieces of fraud…on the American public 
by interest special interest groups,”182 but fails to definitively resolve the question of what gun control 
laws are permissible for federal, state, and local governments with these controlling precedents. Hence, 
McDonald did not stop the flood of litigation succeeding Heller; instead, it allowed for more persons to 
have standing to file litigation through incorporation of the new Second Amendment Right. Perhaps this 
is because the Court wants to control the trajectory of judicial precedent regarding the Second 
Amendment while they are all still alive and still Conservative. Or, maybe, the Court simply likes 
pretending to be an expert on Founding Era documentation. Either way, new cases regarding gun-
control provisions are being filed and ruled on while the gun-as-right v. gun-as-social-evil debate roars. 
Regardless, the fact remains that when a human life is at stake, Justices need exercise caution when 
arriving at decisions that could imperil a life. Thus, an “interests-balancing/undue burden” analysis, 
much to the loathe of Justice Scalia183 and celebration of Justice Stevens, should be employed when 
evaluating the constitutionality of federal, state, and local gun laws with respect to the limitations of the 
“not unlimited”184 Second Amendment Right. 
 In the past month, both the 2nd and the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals delivered opinions 
employing Heller and McDonald to determine the validity of concealed carry laws; however, the 2nd 
Circuit contracted the Second Amendment Right while the 7th Circuit expanded it, illustrating the 
ambiguity of the exceptions to the Second Amendment Right created, codified, and incorporated in the 
aforementioned controlling precedents. Despite this ambiguity, District Court Justice Seeborg opines 
that a “two-step approach”185 is the common methodology employed in post-Heller Circuit court 
182Quoting Chief Justice Warren Burger. Later, he comically remarks “I don’t want to get sued for slander, but I repeat that 
they [the NRA] . . . have had far too much influence on the Congress of the United States than as a citizen I would like to 
see—and I am a gun man. I have guns. I have been a hunter ever since I was a boy.” MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: Interview 
by Charlayne Hunter-Gault with Warren Burger: (PBS television broadcast, Dec. 16, 1991) (Monday transcript # 4226), 
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com (News Library, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer File) 
183 Heller, slip op., at Majority 62, 63: “We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has 
been subjected to a freestanding “interest-balancing” approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands 
of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is 
really worth insisting upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no 
constitutional guarantee at all.” 
184 Heller, slip op., at Majority 54 
185 Justice Seeborg, writing for the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, denied the request of 
Espanola Jackson (in conjunction with the NRA) to enjoin the City of San Francisco from enforcing its  safe storage laws, 
requiring guns to be locked in the home when not carried on the person and banning the sale of certain ammunition. In 
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decisions, first analyzing legislation with regard to the Second Amendment Right, then, if a violation is 
found, conducting a burden analysis to arrive at a standard of scrutiny, proceeding from there to a 
decision. In Kachalsky v. County of Winchester,186 the Court addressed the validity of New York’s 
concealed carry handgun license provision, necessitating “proper cause” be shown prior to obtaining 
the right to carry a concealed weapon outside the confines of the Heller-approved “hearth and home” 
provision. In New York, firearms may not be attained without a license and cannot be concealed and 
carried outside the home in lieu of receiving a separate of firearm license showing that an individual 
has “proper cause” outside of their profession, to carry a concealed weapon.187 The Court determined 
that limits to the right to “keep and bear arms” outside the home were not articulated in Heller, 
consequently resulting in an opaque view of the scope of rights intended by the Supreme Court outside 
of the home. Ultimately, the Court found that ““outside the home, firearm rights have always been more 
limited, because public safety interests often outweigh individual interests in self-defense,”188 creating 
a tradition of state regulation of firearms in public, that did not outweigh the compelling government 
interest in public safety under the level of intermediate scrutiny such as to preclude any justification of 
legislative override of the legislature’s decision. Most importantly, the Court averred that incorporation 
does not mean no opportunities for legislation with regard to the Second Amendment Right.189 
 The 7th Circuit Case, Moore v. Madigan,190 evaluated the constitutionality of Illinois’s ban on 
concealed carry, finding it unconstitutional by an expansive reading of Heller and McDonald, 
reasoning, “to confine the right to be armed to the home is to divorce the Second Amendment from the 
right of self-defense described in Heller and McDonald.”191 The Court’s opinion, written by Judge 
the Order, he wrote “Circuit court decisions after Heller have generally applied a ‘two-step’ approach, first examining 
whether the challenged law places a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment as historically 
understood, and then applying either strict or intermediate scrutiny, depending on the severity of any such burden.” 
Espanola Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, No. C 09-2143 RS; order denying Plaintiff’s motion for injunction. 
186 Kachalsky et al. v. Cty. of Westchester et al United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Docket No 11-
3642(L), decided November 27, 2012. 
187 Kachalsky, v. County of Winchester at page 7, citing N.Y. Penal Law §§ 265.01-265.04, 265.20(a) (3), providing the 
definition of firearm; at page 10, defining “proper cause” as “a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of 
the general community or of persons engaged in the same profession.” 
188 Kachalsky, v. County of Winchester at page 31. 
189 Kachalsky, v. County of Winchester at page 17. 
190 Michael Moore et al., and Mary E. Shepard, et al. v. Lisa Madigan, et al., United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, Docket no. Nos. 12-1269, 12-1788, decided December 11, 2012. 
191 Moore v. Madigan, majority at 8. Judge Posner utilizes an analogy here to solidify his point: that a woman being 
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Posner, regards the Illinois law as an overly restrictive “outlier;”192 however, he wrestles with the 
conception that, perhaps, concealed carry restrictions effectively combat the issue of crime throughout 
his opinion, interspersing his doubts with assertions of concealed carry’s validity193. Eventually, Judge 
Posner settles on the position that, absent of conclusive proof that laws preventing concealed carry lead 
to societal benefit and in conjunction with Illinois’s ability to curtail gun use by those unfit to wield 
them (as delineated in Heller), the right of law-abiding citizens to utilize arms in public and in private 
should not be curtailed.194 In balancing public health concerns with private Second Amendment Rights, 
Judge Posner employs strict scrutiny; conversely, in conjunction with his claims of possible benefit to 
society with a ban on concealed weapons in public, it seems as if the interest of the State is substantially 
related to its means and narrow in scope to invoke a lower scrutiny level. 
 These Circuit Court decisions do little, in that they conflict, to rectify the (very rational) 
assumption that Heller and McDonald will not provide enough room for legislatures to pass effective 
gun regulation laws. Instead, the lack of a consistent application of the principles articulated in those 
cases leads back to the notion that the majority opinions were politically, not constitutionally, motivated. 
In light of the lack of consistent applicability in these cases, I propose that Congress utilize its 
“Commerce Clause” powers by passing “Necessary and Proper” legislation to end the gun violence 
epidemic in the United States. Since guns are a tradable commodity and highly portable, their ability to 
victimized by astalker has a “stronger self-defense claim” in public than in her apartment where she “has a claim to sleep 
with a loaded gun under her mattress.” This analogy is simply not apt for the situation: a stalker presents a clear and 
present danger (alongside a dereliction of police duty to not sufficiently address such an issue) whereas it is far less likely 
that a given individual has a sufficient, constantly present danger in their life as to require the constant carrying of a 
handgun. This contention comports more so with the “proper cause” informed right to concealed carry articulated and 
upheld in Kachalsky, v. County of Winchester. 
192 Moore v. Madigan, majority at 15: “Remarkably, Illinois is the only state that maintains a flat ban on carrying ready-to-
use guns outside the home.” 
193Moore v. Madigan: Judge Posner’s opinion is less effective as a result. He shows too much of the benefit conferred by 
restricting guns to the home to justify rebutting a significant state interest in utilizing such a law to curb violence. He 
points to violent crime decreasing “for many years” alongside a decrease in gun ownership (at 11), that a gun poses more 
danger to more people when carried in public (8), the lack of a “strong pro-gun” culture in Illinois (12), that carrying a 
gun makes a person more likely use the weapon for crime than for defense against criminals (13), that a person becomes a 
“menace to himself and others” if he carries a gun in public without proper firearm training (16), among other reasons.  
194Moore v. Madigan, majority at 14-15 “A blanket prohibition on carrying gun in public prevents a person from 
defending himself anywhere except inside his home; and so substantial a curtailment of the right of armed self-defense 
requires a greater showing of justification than merely that the public might benefit on balance from such a curtailment, 
though there is no proof it would… And empirical evidence of a public safety concern can be dispensed with altogether 
when the ban is limited to obviously dangerous persons such as felons and the mentally ill. Heller v. District of Columbia, 
supra, 554 U.S. at 626.” 
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pass through State and City lines (wherein gun-control restrictions will likely be different) fluidly 
(whether licitly or illicitly) bestows upon Congress the power to regulate such movement of 
merchandise through a uniform law based on the hypothesis that less individual gun ownership with 
more restrictions and barriers to ownership has a positive correlation with a decreased amount of gun 
violence and of gun-related death. A given state has no interest in protecting non-residents from gun 
violence; therefore, a given state will pass laws without regard to the concern of other states, allowing 
for its own citizens to be harmed by the weaponry permissible through the laws of other states.  
 Resultantly, because the Federal government has a responsibility to all its citizens, it has a 
responsibility to ensure their right to life is protected against the negligent or oppressive policies of other 
states.195 The epidemic of gun violence in combination with the notorious proliferation of the gun trade 
between states196 would allow Congress to pass laws regarding “a discrete set of firearm possessions 
that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.”197 Thus, in this 
current state of ambiguity on the Second Amendment Right limitations on gun control policies at all 
levels of government, it is necessary that Congress follow “its own conception of public policy 
concerning the restrictions which may appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce” such that it 
is “is free to exclude from the commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are destined it 
may conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or welfare, even though the state has not 
sought to regulate their use,”198 like the provision of guns. This is the only possible method to 
circumvent the Court’s deleterious effect on public welfare by creating the Second Amendment Right. 
  
195 “Federalist 25,” Alexander Hamilton regarding the danger posed to other states and to the federal government arising 
from the separate possession of military force: “The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the danger to the 
Union from the separate possession of military forces by the States, have, in express terms, prohibited them from having 
either ships or troops, unless with the consent of Congress. The truth is, that the existence of a federal government and 
military establishments under State authority are not less at variance with each other than a due supply of the federal 
treasury and the system of quotas and requisitions.” 
196 The article, “Virginia’s Gift to Gunrunners,” published in the New York Times on February 29, 2012, discusses in great 
depth the “Virginia-New York” gun pipeline, wherein almost 40% of the guns used in New York City homicides can trace 
their origins to Virginia, and the impact that Virginia’s relaxation of gun purchasing limits could potentially have on 
violence in New York City. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/opinion/virginias-gift-to-gunrunners.html 
197 United States v. Alfonso Lopez, Jr., 514 U.S. 549 (1995), majority at 562. 
198 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), Justice Stone for the majority at 114. 
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Addendum Summer 2014 
 Between the release of this paper and June 10, 2014, 74 school shootings199 have occurred in 
the United States: 
200 
Three bills were introduced in the Senate to address some of the 
questions left open by Heller and McDonald regarding the scope of 
background checks, the permissibility of assault rifles, and whether 
limitations could be put on magazine cartridges. None passed.201 The 
public sentiment in the wake of this legislative failure was far from 
uproarious. But why, in the wake of Newtown, did the level of outrage 
fail to translate into action? Apathy. Since the failure of those three bills, 
no new legislation concerning gun control has been introduced. Tragedy 
compounds tragedy, yet apathy wins out.  
The United States has failed in its duty to protect its citizens; in 
their dereliction of duty, hundreds of lives were needlessly lost. People 
kill people, but guns are the main impetus for this violence. Gun control 
is an issue of life or death. The time to act was yesterday. So, today must 
be the day of action. Belated is still better than benumbment. Now, how 
many more people will fall victim to a bullet before someone cries 
“Enough!”? Most likely, not soon enough. And that is the great tragedy of 
the recklessness shown by the Court in Heller and McDonald: by 
creating this new “right,” the avenues available to challenge the state of 
guns in the United States are severely limited. ENOUGH! 
199 "School Shootings in America since Sandy Hook,"  Everytown for Gun Safety(June 10, 2014), 
http://everytown.org/article/schoolshootings/. 
200 Zack Beauchamp, "This Map Shows Every School Shooting since Sandy Hook,"  Vox(2014), 
http://www.vox.com/2014/6/10/5797306/map-school-shooting-sandy-hook. 
201 Jonathan Weisman, "Drive for Gun Control Blocked in Senate,"  The New York Times(2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/us/politics/senate-obama-gun-control.html?pagewanted=all. 
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